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RECONSIDERING SECTION 1983'S NONABROGATION OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Katherine Mims Crocker*
Abstract
Motivated by civil unrest and the police conduct that prompted it,
Americans have embarked on a major reexamination of how
constitutional enforcement works. One important component is 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which allows civil suits against any "person" who violates federal
rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that "person" excludes
states because Section 1983 flunks a condition of crystal clarity.
This Article reconsiders that conclusion-in legalese, Section 1983's
nonabrogation of sovereign immunity-along multiple dimensions.
Beginning with a negative critique, this Article argues that because the
Court invented the crystal-clarity standard so long after Section 1983's
enactment, the caselaw contravenes commonsense interpretive practice,
works a methodological anomaly, and offends foundational democratic
values. This Article also contends that the caselaw rests on inappropriate
assumptions that members of Congress during Reconstruction thought
about federalism the same way members of the Court a century later did.
Turning to an affirmative critique, this Article explores Section 1983's
semantic meaning and expected applications. Among other things, this
analysis uncovers evidence that some members of the public may have
initially understood the statute to reach states-and that members of
Congress inadvertently amended the default definition of "person" in
1874. The upshot is that despite credible counterarguments, the best
reading of Section 1983 may make states suable.
Finally, this Article explores implications for reforming
constitutional-tort law. In particular, it introduces the policy landscape
and proposes a path forward with an initial focus on Fourth Amendment
excessive force claims and a gradual extension to other contexts.
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INTRODUCTION

In its recent decision in Tanzin v. Tanvir,1 the participating members
of the Supreme Court unanimously said that "[a]lthough background
presumptions can inform the understanding of a word or phrase" in a
statute, "those presumptions must exist at the time of enactment. "2
Accordingly, the Court declared that "[w]e cannot manufacture a new
presumption now and retroactively impose it on a Congress that acted
[many] years ago." 3

1. 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020).
2. Id. at 493. Justice Amy Coney Barrett did not participate in this decision.
3. Id.
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But that is exactly what the Court has done in construing a critical
aspect of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a "most important, and ubiquitous, civil rights
statute." 4 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for so-called
constitutional-tort suits against every "person"who "subjects, or causes
to be subjected" someone else "to the deprivation of [federal] rights,
privileges, or immunities" while acting "under color of' state law.5 The
Court has long held that the key word "person" does not include state
governments. Instead, the Court has concluded, it includes only state and
local officials and local governments. 6
The reason victims of constitutional-rights violations cannot sue state
entities even when the government plainly bears fault, the Court says, is
because Section 1983 flunks a condition of crystal clarity.7 That standard,
however, was crafted in the mid-1970's, more than a century after Section
1983's enactment in 1871.8 The Court has implicitly attempted to justify
this retroactive approach by assuming that the Reconstruction Congress
understood state sovereign immunity the same way the postReconstruction Court did. 9 Never mind that at the time of Section 1983's
passage, the so-called Dictionary Act provided that "the word 'person'
may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate," which much
evidence indicates may have included states.1 0 Never mind that the
purpose of Section 1983 was to compel southern states to respect the civil
rights of their recently freed Black citizens."1
This Article asks how the Court's refusal to allow plaintiffs to bring
constitutional-tort suits against states themselves-in legalese, Section
1983's nonabrogation of sovereign immunity-comports with sound
statutory interpretation principles and a fresh look at the historical
evidence. This Article then asks how this analysis could relate to
conversations about improving legal protections for constitutional rights,
especially in relation to the mass movement for racial justice and police
reform following the death of George Floyd and many similar injustices.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a brief overview of
precedent setting out who qualifies as a potential defendant in Section
1983 actions. Part II provides a negative critique of nonabrogation,
contending that the Supreme Court's caselaw fails to justify its
proscription of Section 1983 suits against states. Specifically, this Part
shows how applying the crystal-clarity standard retroactively to interpret
4. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985).

§

5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part H.A.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part H.C.
10. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C.
1); see infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part I.
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Section 1983 contravenes commonsense interpretive practice, works a
methodological anomaly, and offends foundational democratic values.
This Part then contends that precedent in this area rests on anachronistic
assumptions that members of Congress in 1871, the year Section 1983
was adopted, thought about state sovereign immunity the same way
members of the Court a century later did. As things stood when Congress
transformed the relationship between the federal and state governments
during Reconstruction, the Court had never said that citizens could not
sue their own states on the basis of federal question jurisdiction in federal
court. In fact, Chief Justice John Marshall had declared the opposite, and
it was not until 1890 that the Court embraced the broader understanding
of state sovereign immunity that still controls today.
Part III presents an affirmative critique of nonabrogation, offering
arguments (while recognizing counterarguments) for why one could view
Section 1983 as allowing actions against states. This Part first explores
the semantic meaning of the statute's reference to "person[s]," examining
in particular the Dictionary Act's 1871 definition and 1874 amendment.
This Part then considers Section 1983's expected applications around the
time of enactment, as demonstrated with respect to members of Congress
by the statute's legislative history and with respect to members of the
public by its litigation history. This Part also touches on interpretive
methodology more broadly, including the potential relevance of the
Court's recent decision establishing statutory protections against
employment discrimination on account of sexual orientation and
transgender identity.
Part IV shifts the focus from the past to the future, briefly considering
implications of reconsidering Section 1983's nonabrogation of sovereign
immunity for potential reforms to the constitutional-tort system. This Part
begins by providing an introduction to the policy conditions in play. This
Part then proposes a path forward that focuses on Fourth Amendment
excessive force claims, which have been central to the recent popular and
political interest in improving constitutional enforcement, while
preserving opportunities to expand state-government liability to other
kinds of unconstitutional conduct.
I. A DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW

Section 1983 was originally enacted as Section 1 of a major piece of
Reconstruction legislation known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871.12 Also
12. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983) ("Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That any person who, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any
person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
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called the Ku Klux Klan Act, the legislation "was passed by a Congress
that had the Klan 'particularly in mind."'1 3 Accordingly, "The debates are
replete with references to the lawless conditions existing in the South in
1871."14 To quote one legislator:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while
whippings and lynchings and banishment have been visited
upon unoffending
American
citizens,
the local
administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to
apply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the
night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of
felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice.
Immunity is given to crime, and the records of the public
tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective

redress. 15
As another congressman said: "[M]en were murdered, houses were
burned, women were outraged, men were scourged, and officers of the
law shot down; and the State made no successful effort to bring the guilty
to punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged and
innocent." 6
As these quotations demonstrate, while "one main scourge of the
evil-perhaps the leading one" underlying the Act's passage-was the
Klan, "the remedy created was not a remedy against it or its members but
against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or
unwilling to enforce a state law." 1 7 Accordingly, the target of Section
1983, like the target of the recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment it was
enacted to enforce, was state action. 18

immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the state to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to
the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such
proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and
subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases
in such courts, under the provisions of the act of [April 9, 1866], entitled 'An act to protect all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication';
and the other remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such
cases.").
13. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (quoting J. G. RANDALL, THE CIVIL WAR
AND RECONSTRUCTION 857 (1st ed. 1937)), overruledin partby Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).

14. Id.
15. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871) (statement of Rep. Lowe).
16. Id. at 428 (statement of Rep. Beatty).
17. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 175-76 (emphasis omitted).

18. See id. at 176.
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Modern constitutional-tort doctrine begins with the Court's 1961
decision in Monroe v. Pape,19 which reinvigorated Section 1983 after
decades of relative dormancy. 20 Monroe held that the language
referencing conduct occurring "'under color of enumerated state
authority" reaches acts committed in the course of a state or local
official's employment even if state law made them illegal.2 1 Section 1983
was intended, the Court said, not only to "override certain kinds of state
laws," but also to "provide[] a remedy where state law was inadequate"
and "where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not

available in practice. "22
The Court quickly made clear, however, that sovereign immunity
would preclude plaintiffs from using Section 1983 to sue states
themselves. The Court first addressed the issue in the 1974 case Edelman
v. Jordan.23 In Ex parte Young 24 the Court held that district courts could
order state officials to conform their conduct to federal law,
notwithstanding that state governments would end up shouldering the
burden.2 5 The district court in Edelman had entered a Young-style
injunction, but it also went further by directing the defendants-who
were state officials-to pay the plaintiff class what the court of appeals
characterized as "equitable restitution." 2 6 The question before the Justices
was whether the latter ran afoul of the state's sovereign immunity.27 The
Court said yes, articulating a distinction between prospective equitable
relief, which was permissible under Young, and retrospective relief,
which was not.28 Edelman proceeded briefly to consider whether Section
1983 abrogated (or withdrew) the state's immunity protections,
answering no.29

In Quern v. Jordan,30 a 1979 "sequel" arising from the Edelman
litigation, the Court reiterated that Section 1983 does not abrogate
sovereign immunity. 3 1 But questions concerning state suability persisted.
Why? In theory, Quern concerned not whether a state was a "person"
pursuant to Section 1983 simpliciter, but whether an affirmative answer
19. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruledin partby Monellv. Dep't of Soc. Sews., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).

20. See id. at 171-72.
21. Id. at 172 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
22. Id. at 173-74.
23. 415 U.S. 651, 675-77 (1974).

24. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 149, 155-56.
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665.
Id. at 665-69.
Id. at 667-69.
Id. at 674-77.
440 U.S. 332 (1979).
Id. at 333, 338-49.
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was obvious enough to conclude that Congress meant to strip the states
of immunity. The Court had established that Section 1983 actions were
cognizable in both federal and state courts,3 2 but when Quern was
decided, constitutionalized sovereign immunity protections did not
extend into state tribunals.33 So some observers thought Quern left the
door open to sue states in state courts. 34 The Court rejected this notion a
decade after Quern in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,3 5
which came up through the Michigan judicial system. 36 "[A] State is not
a person" within the text of Section 1983, Will held, finally settling the
status of states in the constitutional-tort scheme. 37
In sum, pursuant to Monroe, state and local officials qualify as
"person[s]" under Section 1983. But pursuant to Edelman, Quern, and
Will, states themselves do not. Importantly, Monroe also held that local
governments were not "person[s]," 38 but the Court overruled that
conclusion in the 1978 case Monell v. Department of Social Services.3 9

The bottom line, therefore, is that state and local employees and local
entities are all suable defendants under Section 1983, while state entities
are not.
II. A NEGATIVE CRITIQUE
This Part examines how the Supreme Court has applied its sovereign
immunity abrogation doctrine in the Section 1983 context, which turns
out to be both anomalous and ahistorical. The upshot is that this caselaw
disregards fundamental democratic values by holding a statute enacted in
1871 and adopted to expand civil rights against states to a clear-statement
standard articulated in the mid-1970s and rooted in post-Reconstruction
attitudes about federalism.

32. Felderv. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 147 (1988).
33. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980). Since then, the Court has held that

constitutionalized state sovereign immunity does reach state courts. See Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019) (regarding suits against states in other states' courts); Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (regarding suits against states in their own courts).

34. See, e.g., Karchefske v. Dep't of Mental Health, 371 N.W.2d 876, 880 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985) ("Not only are we persuaded that Quern does not hold that a state is not a § 1983 'person,'
but we find within the Quern opinion some evidence that the state in fact is such a person."),
vacated, 429 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1987).
35. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
36. Id. at 63-64.
37. Id. at 64.
38. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191-92 (1961), overruledin part by Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
39. 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
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A. PreliminaryPoints
A few preliminary points about state sovereign immunity should
prove useful. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." 4 0 The Amendment was put into place shortly after and in response
to the 1793 case Chisholm v. Georgia,4 1 in which the Supreme Court
allowed a citizen of South Carolina to sue Georgia in federal court for a
debt dating back to the Revolutionary War. 42
Initially, the Court appeared to interpret the Eleventh Amendment as
limited to the circumstances it expressly addresses 43-suits "in law or
equity," brought "against one of the United States," and filed "by Citizens
of another State" (or country). 4 4 But since the 1890 case Hans v.
Louisiana,45 a suit filed against a state by one of its own citizens, 46 the
Court "has repeatedly held" that the Constitution affords immunity
protections "extend[ing] beyond the literal text of the Eleventh
Amendment" and instead stemming from a broader historical model of
sovereignty.47
Law professors love to hate the Court's caselaw on state sovereign
immunity. 48 As Professor John Jeffries has explained, many academics
"assert[] that the Eleventh Amendment limits only diversity jurisdiction,
that it has no application in federal question cases, and that in
constitutionalizing some form of state sovereign immunity, the Supreme
Court has been on the wrong track" since Hans.49 While the literature
contains "rebuttals and contributions from other perspectives," the
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
41. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
42. See id. at 420, 479.
43. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL

J.

MELTZER, & DAVID L.

SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 907-08 (7th

ed. 2015).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

45. 134 U.S. 1(1890).
46. Id. at 9.
47. Fed. Mar. Comm'nv. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 754 (2002); see Hess v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 54 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that

sovereign immunity arose "from the peculiarities of political life in feudal England" (citing 1
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE

THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 515-18 (2d ed. 1909)).
48. See Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999

SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7 ("The Court's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence is frequently convoluted,
contradictory, and obscure. It is, in other words, something only a law professor could love.").
49. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L.
REV. 47, 48 (1998).
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predominant position has long been that sovereign immunity
jurisprudence is an "intellectual disaster. "50
One important approach at odds in some respects with the prevailing
view comes from the work of Professors Will Baude and Steve Sachs,51
which in turn builds on research by scholars including Professors Brad
Clark, Kurt Lash, and Caleb Nelson and now-Judge Steve Menashi.5 2
Baude and Sachs argue that "[s]tates are protected by two forms of
sovereign immunity." 5 3 One, which predates the Constitution, "is a
common-law immunity . . . that prevents states from being forced into
court without their consent." 54 This is a relatively broad but weak
immunity, subject to waiver and perhaps abrogation under certain
congressional powers.5 5 The other form of sovereign immunity comes
from the Eleventh Amendment, which Baude and Sachs contend "limit[s]
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts" in exactly the manner
it says. 56 This is a relatively narrow but strong immunity, subject to
neither waiver nor abrogation.5 7
Given the long-running controversy surrounding the basic sources and
scope of state sovereign immunity, it bears emphasizing that the present
project is largely agnostic (albeit somewhat skeptical) about whether the
Court has been correct that the Eleventh Amendment evidences an
expansive understanding of immunity protections incorporated into the
Constitution itself. The analysis here has a different and more specific
focus, homing in on Congress's authority to abrogate states' immunity
and on how the Court has viewed that authority in the constitutional-tort
context. For this project's purposes, then, one can assume that Hans was
right about original understandings, especially to the extent one reads
Hans as potentially consistent with Baude and Sachs's approach (a

50. Id. (footnote omitted).
51. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The MisunderstoodEleventh Amendment, 169
U. PA. L. REV. 609, 614 (2021); William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the ConstitutionalText,
103 VA. L. REV. 1, 4-9 (2017); Stephen E. Sachs, ConstitutionalBackdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 1813, 1868-75 (2012).
52. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 51, at 5 & nn.11-13 (citing Caleb Nelson, Sovereign
Immunity as a Doctrine of PersonalJurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1559 (2002); Bradford R.
Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARv. L. REV. 1817 (2010);
Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background
Principleof Strict Construction,50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1577 (2009); Steven Menashi, Article
III as a ConstitutionalCompromise: Modern Textualism and State Sovereign Immunity, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1135 (2009)).
53. Baude & Sachs, supra note 51, at 5.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 17 (waiver); id. at 36-37 (abrogation).
56. Id. at 4-5.
57. See id. at 17-18 (waiver); id. at 37 (abrogation).

532

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

73

possibility they promote), which is agnostic about abrogation under the
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 58
The Court has held that abrogation requires two elements: first, that
Congress "'mak[e] its intention"' to subject states to suit "'unmistakably
clear"' by "enact[ing] 'unequivocal statutory language,"' and second,
that "some constitutional provision . . . allow[s] Congress" to do so. 59
Quern and Will say that Section 1983 fails this test at the first step
respectively, because using the general term "person[s]" to denote
potential defendants does not disclose an "unmistakably clear" decision
to make states suable and because "person[s]" as a category does not
include states at all.6 0 As the following discussion contends, however, the
Court has failed to justify this logic for two important reasons. The first
relates to retroactive reasoning, and the second, to anachronistic
assumptions.
B. Retroactive Reasoning
The precept that courts will read congressional legislation as
abrogating state sovereign immunity only if it contains unequivocal
language to that effect is what the literature calls a federalism clearstatement rule. These canons of construction say that Congress "cannot
intrude upon the usual balance of state and federal power" without
including "a plain statement of legislative intent."61
As with other clear-statement rules, an important question about
retroactivity arises here. To what extent is it appropriate for courts to
apply this aspect of abrogation doctrine to statutes enacted before it was
established? Three strands of discussion help answer this question in the
context of Section 1983. The first concerns interpretive theory with
regard to clear-statement rules at large. The second concerns the Supreme
Court's retroactive application of the clear-statement concept in
abrogation decisions in general. The third concerns the Court's reliance
on the abrogation-related clear-statement rule in constitutional-tort cases
in particular.

58. See id. at 11 (arguing that "Hans can be read as an Article III case, rather than an
Eleventh Amendment case").
59. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000-01 (2020) (first alteration in original) (first
quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989); and then quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996)).
60. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (stating that "§ 1983 does not explicitly

and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States");
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (stating that "a State is not a
person' within the meaning of § 1983"); supra Part I.
61. John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2025 (2009).
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1. Clear-Statement Rules
The Supreme Court has cast its use of federalism clear-statement rules
in constitutional terms. 62 Consider Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon.63 There, the Court said the abrogation-related clear-statement
rule came from the idea that "the Eleventh Amendment implicates the
fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and
the States." 6 4 The Court went on to declare that "our Eleventh
Amendment doctrine is necessary to support the view of the federal
system held by the Framers of the Constitution." 6 5 This view, the Court
said, rested on the notion that "the States played a vital role in our system
and that strong state governments were essential to serve as a
'counterpoise' to the power of the Federal Government." 6 6 Indeed, the
Court said, "none of the Framers questioned that the Constitution created
a federal system with some authority expressly granted [to] the Federal
Government and the remainder retained by the several States."67
Now-Dean John Manning presents a compelling case that the
connections between federalism clear-statement rules on the one hand
and the Constitution's text, structure, and history on the other are too few
and faint to support the Court's characterization.6 8 As Manning explains,
and as Atascadero exemplifies, the problem with this analysis is that the
sheer existence of a federal system does not necessitate either broadbased sovereign immunity or high-hurdle abrogation rules. 69
"Although certainly correct" that "the United States Constitution
adopts a system of federalism, in which the states retain some attributes
of sovereigns and cede others," Manning explains, "the structural insight
at that level of generality is hopelessly uninformative."70 For just as "the
Constitution embodies federalism," Manning continues, it also
"embodies the principles of personal privacy, private property,
and . . . the separation of powers."71 While "[e]ach assertion describes
goals that the document's drafters set out to achieve, . . . each also
abstracts the purpose underlying specific constitutional provisions to an
unhelpful level of generality, one that disregards the specification of

62. See id. at 2004, 2025-29.
63. 473 U.S. 234 (1985), superseded by statute in part, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-7), as recognized in Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
64. Id. at 238-40.
65. Id. at 239 n.2.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Manning, supra note 61, at 2004-09.
69. See id. at 2058.

70. Id.
71. Id.
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means by which its adopters sought to achieve such purposes." 72 The
Court's framing of the abrogation-related clear-statement rule thus rests
on something of a non sequitur.
That the Constitution itself does not mandate the clear-statement
component of abrogation doctrine, however, does not necessarily make
the requirement illegitimate. Sometimes defenders of clear-statement and
related rules contend that they accurately reflect congressional intent.7 3
But that rationale seems dubious in many instances. 7 4 Somewhat related
is the common suggestion that these doctrines improve the "interbranch
dialogue" between the legislature and the judiciary. 75 But other
commentators call this a "legal fiction." 76 Many interpretative principles
stem not from constitutional directives, but from commitments to
substantive ideals, including "judicially identified constitutional
value[s]" like "federalism, nonretroactivity, or the rule of law." 77 But the
fact that clear-statement rules privilege some ideals over others makes
them susceptible to criticism. A piece by Professors Bill Eskridge and
Phil Frickey, for instance, argues that clear-statement rules "are
particularly countermajoritarian, because they permit the Court to
override probable congressional preferences in statutory interpretation in
favor of norms and values favored by the Court." 78
At the very least, clear-statement rules' defenders argue that
democracy comes out on top in the end because Congress can always
rebut the underlying presumptions by using clear language to legislate in

72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 468-69 (1989) (asserting that the avoidance canon, under which courts construe statutes

to avoid constitutional doubts if possible, "responds to Congress' probable preference for
validation over invalidation").
74. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (as to the

avoidance canon, observing that "it is by no means clear that a strained interpretation of a federal
statute that avoids a constitutional question is any less a judicial intrusion than the judicial
invalidation on constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the same statute").
75. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: ProtectingFundamental
Values with Second-Look Rules ofInterbranchDialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 158488 (2001); Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canardsof ContemporaryLegal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RSRV.
L. REV. 581, 583 (1989) ("Once [rules of 'strict construction'] have been long indulged, they

acquire a sort of prescriptive validity, since the legislature presumably has them in mind when it
chooses its language .... ").
76. Carissa Byrne Hessick & Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal Clear Statement Rules, 97
WASH. U. L. REV. 351, 397 (2019).
77. John F. Manning, Clear StatementRules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399,
399 (2010).
78. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 638 (1992).
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different directions. 79 This should mean that when a clear-statement rule
has already been articulated at the time of a congressional action, the case
for employing the rule to interpret the statute is relatively (even if not
absolutely) strong. In theory, legislators should have been aware of the
rule and known how to avoid its consequences. Likewise, litigants should
be quick to test its application in court, supplying congresspeople an
opportunity to amend the statute as necessary within a reasonable period
after its passage-and potentially before the previous membership and
political milieu have entirely dissipated.
The latter happened following Atascadero's holding that Congress
was not specific enough about whether the statute at issue abrogated state
sovereign immunity. The statute was enacted in 1973; the plaintiff sued
in 1979; the case was decided in 1985; and Congress amended the statute
to provide expressly for suits against states in 1986.80 The Senate
Conference Report said Atascadero had "misinterpreted congressional
intent." 8 1 And a primary proponent of the original bill was on hand to
describe the later amendment as removing "the court-made barrier to
effectuating" the legislature's initial desires.8 2 So the Court-Congress
feedback loop that clear-statement rules are said to facilitate actually
worked.
By contrast, when a clear-statement rule has not already been
articulated at the time of a congressional action, the case for using it starts
to collapse, especially the further in time the litigation follows the
legislation. 83 Congresspeople could not have foreseen the impediment
79. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of JudicialReview, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2000) (arguing that "a narrow

construction of a statute designed to avoid constitutional doubts can be overcome by legislative
action to clarify that the broader reading was what Congress really wanted," such that "[t]he
avoidance canon . .. makes it harder-but still not impossible-for Congress to write statutes that
intrude into areas of constitutional sensitivity").
80. See Dellmuthv. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 240 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing

this history).
81.
82.

S. REP. No. 99-388, at 27 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).
132 CONG. REC. 28,623 (1986) (statement of Sen. Cranston).

83. For previous (often brief) observations about conceptual problems with applying clearstatement rules retroactively, see, for example, William Burnham, Taming the Eleventh
Amendment Without Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 40 CASE W. RSRV. L. REv. 931, 991-92

(1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court's retroactive imposition of the abrogation-related clearstatement rule "undercut[s] ... longstanding . . . reliance interests" held by Congress about its
ability to withdraw state sovereign immunity); Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Essay, Against
MethodologicalStare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1594 (2014) (stating that evidence "suggests
that the Supreme Court's retroactive application of clear statement rules ... may be particularly
problematic from th[e] perspective" of "upset[ting] the legitimate reliance interests of lawmakers
or citizens" (citing Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretationfrom the
Inside An EmpiricalStudy of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation, and the Canons: PartI, 65

536

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

73

they would have to navigate to put some objective into law. And by the
time a plaintiff gets around to advocating or a court gets around to
accepting a reading that runs counter to what a statute's enactors may
have wanted, both the legislators themselves and the political
circumstances that supported their cause may have passed on.
In this scenario, clear-statement rules based on substantive values can
go from being arguably undemocratic to actually antidemocratic. The
suggestion that a later Congress can simply change the statute if it
disapproves of a court's construction overlooks the realities of the
legislative process. 84 For "[t]here are a hundred ways in which a bill can
STAN. L. REV. 901, 945 (2013)); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV.

621, 683-84 (1990) (arguing that when "Congress enacts a statute against certain well-established
background assumptions" and "[t]he Court then switches those assumptions and interprets
Congress' work product in ways that no one at the time would have, or perhaps even could have,
intended," "there is something of a 'bait-and-switch"'; that "[b]ait-and-switch is an unfair con
game in general"; and that "when the victim of the con game is Congress it may be
unconstitutional as well"); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign

Immunity Doctrines: CongressionalImposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203,
1272-73 (1978) (arguing that "[b]ecause it is unrealistic to expect Congress always to have
expressed directly its intent to impose suit on states, especially in statutes enacted prior to [the
rule's establishment], courts following such a clear statement rule would not find private causes
of action even in instances in which 'all the circumstances' made clear that state suability was
intended" and that "[w]hile the rule appears to be one of judicial restraint, it effectively gives
courts a veto over congressional causes of action" (footnote omitted)); Erin Morrow Hawley, The
Supreme Court's Quiet Revolution: Redefining the Meaning of Jurisdiction,56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2027, 2062 (2015) ("[A]lthough clear statement rules are often justified because they
facilitate legislative and judicial communication, the Court's clear statement rule [that Congress
must specify when a procedural requirement should be treated as jurisdictional] cannot be
defended upon clarity grounds because it often applies retroactively, compromising the
background expectations necessary for effective communication between Congress and the
judiciary."); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 567 (1992) (arguing that the abrogation-related clear-

statement rule "may prove particularly offensive as applied to statutes enacted . . when prevailing
Supreme Court decisions suggested that less positive indicia of congressional intent would be
sufficient"); Brian G. Slocum, Overlooked TemporalIssues in Statutory Interpretation, 81 TEMP.
L. REV. 635, 663-64, 667-69 (2008) (arguing that "courts should consider prospective-only

application of new or modified interpretive rules," including clear-statement rules, that "would
require or allow courts to adopt a second-best statutory interpretation"); Amanda L. Tyler,
Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1389, 1419-20, 1420 n.143 (2005)

(arguing that "the often inconsistent application of canons undercuts th[e] objective" of
"achieving predictability and continuity in the statutory regime" and that "[p]erhaps worst of all,"
the Court has demonstrated "a fondness for creating new and quite powerful canons and applying
them retroactively," including in the abrogation-related clear-statement context).
84. See, e.g., Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and CongressionalRegulation of
States, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1959, 1967 n.42 (1994) ("The difficulties associated with 'retroactive'

applications of interpretive approaches might suggest that clear statement rules ought to be applied
only to current legislation. It is unclear, however, why the inaccessibility of the enacting Congress
would militate against the consistent application of a particular interpretive approach: the sitting
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die even though there is no opposition to it"8 5 -assuming someone
introduces a bill in the first place. And the enacting Congress may have
encountered a unique political moment to which its members wanted to
respond in a specific and abiding way. Applying a clear-statement rule
retroactively, and especially with a large time lag, can rob the previous
legislature of its constitutional prerogative to do just that.
The concrete importance of these abstract arguments depends on the
extent to which courts actually apply clear-statement rules retroactively
in real-life cases. The Supreme Court recently repudiated this practice. In
Tanzin, the participating Justices unanimously stated that "[a]lthough
background presumptions can inform the understanding of a word or
phrase, those presumptions must exist at the time of enactment," such that
the Court "cannot manufacture a new presumption now and retroactively
impose it on a Congress that acted [many] years ago." 86 But as the
ensuing analysis shows, the Court has sometimes done just that, including
in establishing Section 1983's nonabrogation of sovereign immunity.
2. Abrogation Decisions
With regard to abrogation, recall that the clear-statement rule is just
the first part of a two-step framework. To withdraw sovereign immunity,
Congress must also legislate under a constitutional provision
empowering it to subject states to suit. 87 Nowadays, any such authority
almost always comes from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 88
Section 5 says that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article" 89 (with such
provisions including the Due Process Clause, the basis for the Court's
incorporation of the Bill of Rights protections against the states 90). The
point of the analysis here is to show-by walking systematically through
the relevant caselaw-that the Supreme Court appears never to have
applied the abrogation-related clear-statement rule in a way that was both
retroactive and dispositive when considering a statute deemed properly
enacted under Section 5. The sole exception, and thus an important
anomaly, involves cases concerning Section 1983.
The most relevant decisions are ones where the Court held that statutes
represented a valid exercise of Section 5 authority but that Congress
failed to speak clearly enough to strip states of their immunity. In both of
Congress is capable of reforming old statutes that it feels have been misconstrued, just as with
more recent legislation." (citation omitted)).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 538 (1983).
Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 493 (2020).
See supratext accompanying note 59.
See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1003 (2020).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019).
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these cases not concerning Section 1983, the provision in question was
enacted after the seeds of the clear-statement rule sprouted in the 1973
case Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare v.
Department ofPublicHealth & Welfare. 9 1 There, the Court said that "[i]t
would . . be surprising . . to infer that Congress deprived Missouri of
her constitutional immunity without . .. indicating in some way by clear
language that the constitutional immunity was swept away."92
Atascadero, the first of these cases, concerned the Rehabilitation Act, 93
which overcame two presidential vetoes and "was finally signed into law
on September 26, 1973"94-more than five months after the Employees
decision was published. 95 And Dellmuth v. Muth,96 the second of these
cases, centered around the Education of the Handicapped Act, 97 which
was enacted in 1970 but amended in assertedly relevant ways in 1975 and
1986, along with a 1986 amendment to the Rehabilitation Act. 98
Even cases where the Court concluded that the clear-statement rule
was satisfied (meaning that retroactive application would have been
harmless) have almost always involved statutes that became effective
after Employees was decided in 1973. Some held that statutes passed both
parts of the two-step abrogation test. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.99
91. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
92. Id. at 285.
93. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.

§§

701-

7961).
94. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 255 n.7 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), superseded by statute in part, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7), as recognized

in Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
95. Justice Brennan contended that the Court could not realistically have expected Congress
to respond to the "clear language" standard from Employees (let alone to the tweaks from the case
at bar) in a bill that had already advanced so far through the legislative process. See id. Regardless,
Parden v.

Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department-which predated

Employees by nine years-should have provided legislators fair warning, as four Justices argued
for a clear-statement approach there. See 377 U.S. 184, 198-99 (1964) (White, J., joined by
Douglas, Harlan, & Stewart, JJ., dissenting), overruled by Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
96. 491 U.S. 223 (1989).

97. Pub. L. No. 91-230, Title VI, 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (codified as amended as the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482).
98. See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 228-30. Justice Brennan again objected to applying the clearstatement rule on the ground that the Court "resort[ed] to an interpretative standard that Congress
could have anticipated only with the aid of a particularly effective crystal ball." Id. at 241
(Brennan, J., dissenting). But rather than getting at retroactivity generally, he argued specifically
that Employees and several successor cases indicated that "this Court would consider legislative
history and make inferences from text and structure in determining whether Congress intended to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id. He criticized the Court for abandoning that pattern
in favor of requiring more pointed statutory language. Id. at 241-42.
99. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruledin partby Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996).
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involved the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 198000 and the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986.101 Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs10 2 involved a family-care claim under the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). 103 Tennessee v. Lane104 concerned
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 105 enacted in 1990,
as applied to claims for access to court buildings. 106 United States v.
Georgia107 also concerned Title II of the ADA, this time as applied to
claims alleging cruel and unusual punishment in prison.10 8
Other cases in the same bucket held that statutes passed the clearstatement prong but failed the constitutional-authorization prong of the
abrogation test. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida109 held that
Congress could not withdraw state sovereign immunity when acting
under the Commerce Clause 1 0 -or under any Article I power, according
to a later case's gloss on the decision." But Seminole Tribe first
concluded that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,1 1 2 passed in 1988,
included "an 'unmistakably clear' statement of [Congress's] intent to
abrogate." 1 13 Similarly, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank1 4 held that Congress exceeded
its authority under Section 5 by attempting to abrogate sovereign
immunity in the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act,11 5 which was enacted in 1992.116 But that was only after
100. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
101. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code); Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 5.
102. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).

103. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.
and 29 U.S.C.); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724.
104. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).

105. Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 201-246, 104 Stat. 327, 337-53 (1990) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165).
106. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513.
107. 546 U.S. 151 (2006).

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 153, 155.
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Id. at 47.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636

(1999). But cf Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) (holding that the

Bankruptcy Clause, an Article I provision, itself abrogates state sovereign immunity).
112. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
1168 and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721).

§§

1166-

§§

2541,

113. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56.
114. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
115. Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified as amended at7 U.S.C.
2570 and 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 296).
116. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 630-32.
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concluding that Congress "made its intention to abrogate the States'
immunity 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."'11 7
Next came a pair of cases also holding that congressional attempts to
subject states to suit were unsupportable under Section 5. But again, the
decisions in both cases Kimel v. FloridaBoardofRegents1 18 and Board
of Trustees v. Garrett1 9 -began by determining that Congress spoke
clearly in trying to withdraw sovereign immunity. 120 And again, both
statutes-in Kimel, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967,121 which was amended in relevant part in 1974,122 and in Garrett,
the ADA, which was enacted in 1990123-postdated Employees, where
the Court articulated the clear-statement rule in 1973.
This trend has continued more recently too. Coleman v. Court of
Appeals12 4 held that Section 5 did not allow Congress to subject states to
suit for FMLA self-care claims. 125 But the same FMLA provisions the
Court said reflected an "unmistakably clear" aim to abrogate immunity
in Hibbs did likewise in Coleman.126 And in Allen v. Cooper,12 7 decided
just last year, the Court held that Congress could not make states liable in
copyright-infringement actions under either Article I or Section 5.128 But
first it said that "[n]o one here disputes that Congress used clear enough
language."129
In one instance, the Court applied the clear-statement rule
retroactively to a valid exercise of Section 5 authority but found the rule
satisfied, meaning that the post hoc approach did not affect the
outcome. 130 That case, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 13 1 came early in the
abrogation line, before Atascadero tightened the requirement by stating
that "Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself' (as opposed

117. Id. at 635 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)).
118. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).

119. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
120. Id. at 363-64; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73.
121. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
122. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 68, 73-74.
123. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360.

§§

621-634).

124. 566 U.S. 30 (2012).
125. Id. at 43-44.
126. Id. at 35-36 (quoting Nev. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003)); see
supra text accompanying note 103.

127. 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
128. Id. at 998-99, 1007.
129. Id. at 1001.
130. See Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447-50, 452-53, 456 (1976).
131. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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to, say, in the legislative history). 132 Fitzpatrick also involved recent
legislation.1 33 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972134
predated Employees but postdated Parden v. Terminal Railway of the
Alabama State Docks Department,135 a 1964 case in which four Justices
supported a clear-statement rule. 136 All these factors likely minimized any
attention the anomalous approach might otherwise have drawn.
What is more, the assertion that the Court appears never to have
retroactively applied the abrogation-related clear-statement rule in an
outcome-dispositive way to a valid exercise of Section 5 authority
accounts for Employees itself. The statute at issue there, the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938,137 was enacted under the Commerce Clause rather
than under Section 5,138 and the two sources of congressional power are
different in relevant ways. As Employees explained, "It is not easy to infer
that Congress in legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which has
grown to vast proportions in its applications, desired silently to deprive
the States of an immunity they have long enjoyed under another part of
the Constitution." 139 That logic falls away where Congress acts under the
Fourteenth Amendment, which-unlike the Commerce Clause-is
specifically directed at states. 140
The Court relied on exactly this reasoning in a footnote in the 1978
case Hutto v. Finney.14 1 Hutto said the abrogation-related clear-statement
rule was irrelevant in determining whether state parties were subject to a
statute providing for litigation cost-shifting. "Just as a federal court may
132. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (emphasis added),
superseded by statute in part, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506,
§ 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7), as recognized in Lane

v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
133. See 427 U.S. at 447-48.

134. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.
and 42 U.S.C.).
135. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruledby Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
136. See id. at 198-99 (1964) (White, J., joined by Douglas, Harlan, & Stewart, JJ.,

dissenting).
137. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219).
138. Emps. of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 282 (1973).

139. Id. at 285. In addition, the Fair Labor Standards Act was amended in an assertedly
relevant way in 1966, see id., which was post-Parden.
140. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power . .

[t]o regulate

Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... "),
with id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); id. amend. XIV, § 5 "The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
141. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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treat a State like any other litigant when it assesses costs" as part of its
"'inherent authority,"' the Court said, "so also may Congress . . . have
[a] . . . class of costs apply to the States, as it does to all other litigants,
without expressly stating that it intends to abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity."142 But "[e]ven if we were not dealing with an
item such as costs," the Court continued, the clear-statement rule would
not have applied. 143 For while Employees involved "a statute rooted in
Congress' Art. I power," Hutto involved "a statute enacted to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment," which expressly "'embod[ies] limitations on
state authority. '144
It is important, therefore, that both Employees and what appears to be
the only subsequent case where the clear-statement rule affected the
outcome when applied retroactively, Welch v. Texas Department of
Highways & Transportation,145 involved statutes enacted under the
Commerce Clause rather than under Section 5. In Welch, the Court
refused to allow the plaintiff to sue state defendants under the Jones
Act, 146 enacted in 1920, on the ground that "Congress has not expressed
in unmistakable statutory language its intention to allow States to be sued
in federal court."14 7 Welch assumed a statute passed pursuant to the
commerce power could abrogate sovereign immunity1 48 -an assumption
Seminole Tribe later held incorrect. 14 9 But Welch quoted Employees to
indicate that because the commerce power "has grown to vast proportions
in its applications," the case for requiring a clear statement of state
suability was especially compelling. 150
A few additional cases are pertinent to considering the retroactive
application of the abrogation-related clear-statement rule outside of the
Section 1983 context. In Hoffman v. ConnecticutDepartment of Income

Maintenance,15 1 the Court held that Congress did not legislate with the
requisite clarity in a bankruptcy provision enacted in 1978,152 five years
after Employees came down. InBlatchfordv. Native Village ofNoatak,153
moreover, the plaintiffs argued that a statute extending federal-court
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 696 (quoting Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 74 (1927)).
Id. at 698 n.31.
Id. (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
483 U.S. 468 (1987).

146. Ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988 (1920) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
U.S.C. as revised).

§ 38 and scattered sections of 46

147. Welch, 483 U.S. at 475.
148. Id. at 475 & n.5.
149. See supratext accompanying note 110.

150. Welch, 483 U.S. at 478 (quoting Emps. of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't
of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973)).
151. 492 U.S. 96 (1989) (plurality opinion).

152. Id. at 101.
153. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
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jurisdiction to federal question cases brought by "Indian tribe[s] or
band[s]" irrespective of the amount in controversy allowed them to avoid
state sovereign immunity.15 4 The Court disagreed, in part on the ground
that the provision was not specific enough to make states suable.1 55
Because the statute was enacted in 1966,156 seven years before Employees
was decided in 1973, this reasoning was retroactive. But the Court
recognized as much-and therefore also analyzed the issue under the
operative law when the statute came into being, concluding that the
abrogation argument still failed.1 57 Then, in Raygor v. Regents of
University ofMinnesota,158 the Court relied on Blatchford's reasoning to
hold that the generally worded federal supplemental-jurisdiction statute,
enacted in 1990, did not allow federal-court adjudication of claims
against states. 159
Finally, the Court expressed skepticism about viewing nineteenthcentury events through a clear-statement lens, albeit in a less direct way,
in College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation
Expense Board.160 In College Savings Bank, the majority criticized
Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent for relying on the clear-statement rule to
decline to treat Hans, which was decided in 1890,161 as an abrogation case
(although the majority would have reached the same result for a different
reason). 162 The majority said Justice Breyer's suggestion that the statute
providing federal-court jurisdiction in Hans "did not expressly 'purpor[t]
to pierce state immunity"' was misguided because "[t]he so-called 'clear
statement rule' was not even adumbrated until" Employees was decided
in 1973.163

In all the precedent inspected here, the Supreme Court never applied
the abrogation-related clear-statement rule retroactively to refuse to
recognize a congressional withdrawal of state sovereign immunity in a
154. Id. at 783 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1362). At the time, and unlike now, federal question
cases normally had to meet a monetary threshold to secure federal-court jurisdiction. See Federal
Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369.
155. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786-88.
156. See id. at 787.

157. See id. at 787-88. Although the plaintiffs asked the Court to engage in this exercise, see
id. at 787, that the majority did so is significant. The Justices who dissented, moreover, denied
the clear-statement rule's relevance both because they believed the rule "ill-conceived" and
because it had been "adopted so recently." Id. at 795 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
158. 534 U.S. 533 (2002).

159. Id. at 540-42.
160.
161.
162.
163.

527 U.S. 666 (1999).
See supra text accompanying note 46.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 687 n.5.
Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting id. at 700 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). In College

Savings Bank, the Court held that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, enacted in 1992, was
not a valid exercise of Section 5 authority and thus could not abrogate state sovereign immunity.
See id. at 672-75. But it did not specifically address the clear-statement issue. See id.
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statute supported by the prevailing understanding of Section 5. That
brings the analysis to decisions involving Section 1983, where the Court
has applied the abrogation-related clear-statement rule in just that way.
3. Constitutional-Tort Cases
Recall that the Court initially considered whether Section 1983
abrogated state sovereign immunity in Edelman, decided in 1974.164 But
Edelman's analysis was exceedingly brief, with the first meaningful look
at how the clear-statement rule might apply in this context coming in
Quern, decided in 1979.165 There, the majority proclaimed that it was
"simply . . unwilling to believe . .
that Congress intended by the
general language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity
of the States." 16 6
Disagreeing in a separate opinion, Justice William Brennan Jr.
focused on how Section 1983 was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was expressly "'directed to the States"' and
"exemplifie[d] the 'vast transformation' worked on the structure of
federalism in this Nation by the Civil War." 167 In light of the historical
background and a general statutory definition of "person" in place when
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was adopted, 168 Justice Brennan argued, "the
face of the statute" was "plain enough" to articulate a cause of action
against state defendants. 169
The majority invoked the clear-statement rule in response. "Our cases
consistently have required a clearer showing of congressional purpose to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity than our Brother Brennan is
able to marshal," the Court said.17 0 For Section 1983, the majority
reasoned, "does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face
an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States." 17 1 In tracing the
clear-statement rule's lineage, the earliest case to which Quern pointed
was Employees. 172 The Court never explained why it might have been
proper to apply a substantive canon adopted in 1973 to a statute enacted
in 1871, more than a century earlier. Nor did Justice Brennan press the
matter, despite making a plea for "the present Congress . . to rectify this

164. See supratext accompanying notes 23-29.
165. See supratext accompanying note 31.
166. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979).
167. Id. at 354-55 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (first quoting Exparte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880); and then quoting Mitchumv. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).

168. See infra Part III.A.1.
169. Quern, 440 U.S. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
170. Id. at 343 (majority opinion).

171. Id. at 345.
172. See id. at 343-45.
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erroneous misinterpretation" and noting that "[t]he 42d Congress, of
course, can no longer pronounce its meaning with unavoidable clarity." 17 3
Quern shows exactly why filtering a statute through a substantive
canon established so long after the legislation's passage can have
profoundly antidemocratic effects. 174 Obviously, none of the
congressmen who served in 1871 were around Washington, D.C., when
Quern was decided in 1979 (or even when Employees was decided in
1973) to help clarify and codify what they thought Section 1983 meant in
light of the Court's new interpretive approach. And the Reconstruction
Congress-more than almost any other in American history-faced
unique conditions and pursued unique objectives that its members wanted
to shape the nation for generations to come. So it would have been
unrealistic for the Court to expect that later legislators, with their own
political realities and priorities, would adopt their postbellum
predecessors' anticipated provisions even if they agreed with them.
Stated differently, had the Court refrained from employing the clearstatement rule to interpret Section 1983 and held under an even-handed
analysis that the 1871 statute abrogated state sovereign immunity, later
Congresses would have faced an opt-out situation with regard to state
suability rather than the opt-in situation that Quern put in place.
Behavioral law-and-economics literature says enormous differences can
flow from opt-out versus opt-in choices, 17 5 in important part because
decisional inertia can have powerful effects. 176 And legislative-process
theory says these differences are all the more consequential in the
congressional context because of limited resources and facets like
interest-group politics, agenda-setting prerogatives, and veto-gate
prevalence. 177 Factoring in vastly dissimilar background conditions at
Time A, when an option comes into existence, and Time B, when some
choice architect imposes a default rule, the prospect that selecting an optin versus opt-out baseline will make little difference seems exceedingly
small. So aside from fortuitously addressing state suability with extreme
specificity, there was nothing Congress could have done in 1871 (or
reasonably expected anyone else to do later) to effectuate an intent to hold
states liable for constitutional violations.
Will's further ruling that Section 1983 does not include states within
the word "person[s]" even beyond the abrogation context extended the
173. Id. at 365-66 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
174. See supratext accompanying notes 83-86.

175. See, e.g., Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging PatientDecision-Making, 92 WASH. L. REV.
1255, 1293-94 (2017) ("One study that compared rates of organ donation in opt-in countries with
those in opt-out countries found that nearly 60 percentage points separated the two groups (the
opt-ins versus the opt-outs)." (citing Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?,
302 SCI. 1338, 1339 (2003))).
176. See Cass R. Sunstein, Decidingby Default, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 17 (2013).
177. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 78, at 639-40.
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flaws of the Court's retroactive reasoning. 17 8 Will said that requiring
Congress to "make its intention . .. 'unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute"' was not just an abrogation-related doctrine, but was
instead an "ordinary rule of statutory construction" applicable wherever
the "usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government" was at stake. 179 But none of the cases Will cited reached
back anywhere near 1871.180 Most involved discussions confined to
particular issues not involving the immunity-unrelated question whether
a federal statute subjected states to suit.18 1 And the one that framed the
rule as a general principle itself cited cases stretching back no furtherthan
2
the mid-twentieth century.1 8

C. AnachronisticAssumptions
Related to but separable from its radically retroactive reasoning, as the
following discussion details, the Supreme Court in Quern projected its
current view of state sovereign immunity backward in time to say that
when enacting Section 1983 in 1871, Congress knew that including states
within the class of potential defendants would have transgressed usual
structural constitutional limits. Accordingly, Quern reasoned, Congress
would have made the desire to withdraw states' immunity protections
more manifest-meaning that it must not have wanted to do so in the first
place. 18 3 These assumptions were anachronistic and, like the Court's
handling of the clear-statement rule, had the effect of denying the
Reconstruction Congress's democratic authority.
The discussion that follows explores the historical conditions
confronting the congressmen who passed the 1871 Civil Rights Act and
then examines some possible explanations for the Court's muddled
analysis.

178. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37. For a somewhat similar argument from

Professor William Burnham, the plaintiff's attorney in Will, see William Burnham, "Beam Me
Up, There's No Intelligent Life Here": A Dialogue on the Eleventh Amendment with Lawyers
from Mars, 75 NEB. L. REV. 551, 568-72 (1996).

179. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).

180. See id. (collecting citations).
181. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987) (regarding conditioning federal
grants); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 (regarding abrogating sovereign immunity); Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (regarding issuing Young-style injunctions to

follow state law); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981)
(regarding conditioning federal grants); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
(regarding preempting police powers).
182. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 & n.16 (1971) (collecting citations).
183. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341-43 (1979).
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1. Historical Conditions
The Eleventh Amendment responded precisely to the circumstances
underlying Chisholm.18 4 The provision's text makes clear that federal
courts generally cannot decide cases (or at least cases premised on
diversity jurisdiction, like Chisholm was) where citizens sue states that
are not their own. But it makes clear little else. Multiple questions
surrounding the Amendment and state sovereign immunity more
generally-including "whether the Amendment barred a federal court
suit against a state . .. by one of the state's own citizens" asserting a
federal question claim-thus remained "open . . . nearly until the end of
the nineteenth century. "185
The Supreme Court did not definitively answer whether states were
subject to suits filed in federal court by their own citizens until 1890,
when it said no in Hans.186 The delay makes sense. With the exception of
a provision in place for a brief period between 1801 and 1802, Congress
did not confer general federal question jurisdiction on federal courts until
1875187-which was, of course, after it adopted Section 1983 in 1871.
Before that jurisdictional grant, citizens would have found few occasions
to try to sue their own states in federal court.
Given all this, it seems quite possible that many members of Congress
did not hold comprehensive views about sovereign immunity beyond the
text of the Eleventh Amendment when enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1871-including about how the doctrine might have applied to claims
arising under Section 1. But to the extent that members of Congress did
have well developed thoughts about what the Eleventh Amendment or
sovereign immunity more generally entailed, it at least seems
questionable to what degree they adhered to traditional notions of a
state's place vis-a-vis the federal government, especially insofar as
individual rights were involved. 188
Creating general federal question jurisdiction, after all, was just "part
of a larger substantive law and jurisdictional revolution that was an
outgrowth of the Civil War and Reconstruction."189 Michael Collins
summarizes these legislative innovations as follows:
184. See supratext accompanying notes 40-42.
185. FALLON ET AL., supra note 43, at 908.
186. See supratext accompanying notes 43-47.

187. Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71

IOWA

L.

REV. 717, 720 & n.19 (1986).
188. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV.

959, 1009 (1987) ("[T]he framers of the [Civil Rights Act of 1871] were far more concerned with
achieving constitutional compliance than with respecting traditional notions of state
sovereignty.... It is very unlikely, therefore, that they would have supported the recognition of
the various immunities and shields from national intervention that litter the law of federal
courts.").
189. Collins, supra note 187, at 720.
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Beginning in 1863, Congress greatly expanded the
availability of the writ of habeas corpus by permitting
defendants before or after trial to remove any state court civil
or criminal action arising out of acts committed during the
Civil War 'by virtue or under color of any federal executive
or legislative authority. Four years later, Congress permitted
persons held under state authority 'in violation of the
Constitution' or federal law to use the writ to challenge the
constitutionality of their detention. The national legislature
opened the doors of the federal courts at about the same time
to state law actions in which litigants were denied or could
not enforce statutorily guaranteed civil rights in state courts.
During the further course of Reconstruction, Congress also
created federal criminal sanctions and a variety of civil
actions directly to vindicate newly created federal civil
rights. Congress expanded removal on the basis of diversity
of citizenship, and it enlarged the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and jurisdiction over other specialized
areas of federal law outside the field of civil rights. 190
While these contexts were all different, it seems sensible to suspect that
at least some of the same legislators who passed these provisions could
have believed that state sovereign immunity posed at most a common law
barrier that Congress could overcome to a federal question suit against a
state by one of its own citizens-or, again, that the matter remained up in
the air.
Importantly, as of 1871, the only high-court decision analyzing a suit
against a citizen's own state in light of the Eleventh Amendment had
expressly held the provision's protections inapplicable. In 1821, Cohens
v. Virginia191 addressed whether what amounted to an appeal of a state
criminal prosecution counted as a "suit in law or equity" against a state
within the terms of the Amendment. 192 The Court said no. 19 3 But in an
alternative holding, the Court-speaking through Chief Justice
Marshall-said that "should we in this be mistaken, the error does not
affect the case" at bar. 194 For "[i]f this writ of error be a suit in the sense
of the 11th amendment, it is not a suit commenced or prosecuted 'by19a5
citizen of another State, or by a citizen or subject of any foreign State."'
190. Id. at 720-22 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81,
755, 756; and then quoting Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385).
191. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
192. Id. at 375-76, 405-12 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI).

§

5, 12 Stat.

193. Id. at 412.
194. Id.; see FALLON ET AL., supra note 43, at 907 & n.6 (calling this reasoning an
"alternative holding" in relation to the conclusion that "[b]ecause the defendants' petition for the
writ of error was entirely defensive and sought no affirmative relief,... it was not a 'suit' within
the meaning of the [Eleventh] Amendment").
195. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 412.
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Instead, the Court said, it "is governed entirely by the constitution as
originally framed, and we have already seen, that in its origin, the judicial
power was extended to all cases arising under the constitution or laws of
the United States, without respect to parties."196 This conclusion,
moreover, aligned with the Marshall Court's general view of the Eleventh
Amendment as articulating a narrow exception to the scope of Article III
jurisdiction.197
The picture Quern painted failed to account for these historical
conditions. "[N]either logic . . nor the legislative history of the 1871 Act
compels, or even warrants, . . the conclusion that Congress intended by
the general language of the Act to overturn the constitutionally
guaranteed immunity of the several States," the Court declared. 198 "Given
the importance of the States' traditional sovereign immunity," Quern
said, "if in fact the Members of the 42d Congress believed that § 1 of the
1871 Act overrode that immunity, surely there would have been lengthy
debate on this point." 199 But "not one Member of Congress mentioned the
Eleventh Amendment or the direct financial consequences to the States
of enacting § 1" in the debates, the Court continued, concluding that "this
silence on the matter is itself a significant indication of the legislative
intent of § 1.,"200
This kind of reasoning assumed that the Congress of a century prior
understood the Eleventh Amendment the same way the Court of the
present did. But if there was no widespread and definitive belief that state
sovereign immunity barred cases beyond the Amendment's textual ambit
in 1871 (and in particular suits against a plaintiff's own state after
Cohens), there would have been little cause to think congressmen would
have felt compelled to use especially specific language to subject states
to suit. The same would hold true if congressmen viewed state sovereign
immunity outside of the Eleventh Amendment as a common law
protection, which legislation could easily displace. And one cannot
necessarily attribute much meaning to the absence of sovereign immunity
references in the legislative record. 20 1 "Congress may have been silent on
196. Id.
197. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 43, at 907.
198. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979).
199. Id. at 343.
200. Id.

201. Justice Antonin Scalia made a related point in Welch. Expressing doubt about whether
Article III incorporated "a nearly universal 'understanding' that the federal judicial power could
not extend to [suits brought by individuals against States]," Justice Scalia argued that "for nearly
a century" since the decision in Hans, Congress had acted with the assumption of pervasive state
immunity. Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496 (1987) (Scalia,

J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). "[I]f we were now to find that assumption
to have been wrong," Scalia concluded, "we could not, in reason, interpret [post-Hans] statutes as
though the assumption never existed." Id.

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

550

[Vol.

73

the subject" for many reasons, among them "because other parts of the
bill"-which "included such invasions of state sovereignty as military
takeovers of state and local governments and the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus for persons arrested by federal agents"-"were more
controversial."202
Further undermining the Court's abrogation-related logic is the
possibility that legislators in 1871 thought the recently ratified Fourteenth
Amendment-which Quern also brushed aside 203 -at least potentially
resolved any sovereign immunity problems. The Court would go on to
declare a few years later, in the 1879 case Ex parte Virginia,204 that
because "[t]he prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to
the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power,"
congressional enforcement under Section 5 "is no invasion of State
sovereignty."205 It made no difference, the Court said, that "such
legislation is restrictive of what the State might have done before the
constitutional amendment was adopted." 2 06
It would have been logical, therefore, for members of Congress in
1871 to have adopted a posture toward state immunity protections that
was quite different from the one Quern posited. In short, Reconstruction
was an exceptional time in American political and constitutional life.
Reconstruction radically reoriented the relationship between the federal
government (including the federal court system) and state governments,
especially when it came to the role of the former in defining and
protecting citizens from civil rights abuses enabled by the latter. As
Justice Harry Blackmun summed things up in a 1985 law review article:
"Taken collectively, the Reconstruction Amendments, the Civil Rights
Acts, and the[] new jurisdictional statutes, all emerging from the caldron
of the War Between the States, marked a revolutionary shift in the
relationship among individuals, the States, and the Federal
Government." 2 07 The empirical question whether members of Congress
actually took the position hypothesized here is explored below (as is the
theoretical question to what extent the subjective intent of enacting
202. Burnham, supra note 83, at 993 n.259.
203. See Quern, 440 U.S. at 342 (stating that "the circumstances surrounding the adoption

of the Fourteenth Amendment" did not support abrogation).
204. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
205. Id. at 346.
206. Id.

207. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and FederalProtection of Individual Rights Will
the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985); see also Edward A.
Purcell, Jr., The ParticularlyDubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History,
and "FederalCourts," 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 2044 (2003) (arguing that Hans's reasoning was

"rooted in a pre-Fourteenth Amendment view of the federal courts' role, in the outmoded
assumption that their primary purpose was to protect noncitizens and aliens, not a state's own
citizens").
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legislators should count in interpretation). 208 What matters for present
purposes is that the Court's uncritical assumptions were not obviously
correct.
Again, the point is not that Hans was wrong, at least insofar as the
logic there focused on historical understandings at the time of the
founding and the Eleventh Amendment's ratification. The point is instead
that even if Hans was right about what people previously believed,
understandings about state sovereign immunity-and especially about
congressional abrogation-could have shifted in the decades afterward in
light of factors like the Eleventh Amendment's enigmatic text and
judicial treatment or all the reforms flowing from the Civil War. Or
people could have understood a background principle of state sovereign
immunity as a common law concept all along. 209 And the point is
furthermore that regardless of what these possibilities might mean for
constitutional construction, they are at least potentially relevant to what
people might have thought about a statute enacted in the postbellum
period.
Will piggybacked on Quern here too. "Given that a principal purpose
behind the enactment of § 1983 was to provide a federal forum for civil
rights claims," Will said, Quern's holding that the statute preserved
immunity protections in federal courts indicated that Congress did not
subject states to suit in state courts either. 2 10 In a footnote, the Court
briefly acknowledged but entirely evaded the anachronism issue.
"Petitioner argues that Congress would not have considered the Eleventh
Amendment in enacting § 1983 because in 1871 this Court had not yet
held that the Eleventh Amendment barred federal-question cases against
States in federal court," Will said. 211 But "[t]his argument is no more than
an attempt to have this Court reconsider Quern," the majority declared,
"which we decline to do." 212
2. Possible Explanations
There are good reasons to suspect the Supreme Court understood the
anachronistic nature of the narrative it told. Fitzpatrick, which came
down in 1976, is particularly pertinent. 2 13 Fitzpatrick established that
Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant
208. See infra Parts III.B.1 and II.C.
209. See supratext accompanying notes 51-58.

210. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).
211. Id. at 67 n.6.
212. Id.; see William Burnham & Michael C. Fayz, The State as a "Non-Person"Under
Section 1983: Some Comments on Will and Suggestions for the Future, 70 OR. L. REv. 1, 19

(1991) (stating that Will did not "determine what the state of eleventh amendment immunity was
in 1871").
213. See supratext accompanying note 130-31.
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to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and upheld the extension of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964214 to state governments through
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.215
In Fitzpatrick, the Court waxed poetic about how the Fourteenth
Amendment had long been understood to expand congressional power at
the expense of state sovereignty. In addition to repeating the notion that
enforcing the Amendment works "no invasion of State sovereignty," the
Court quoted Ex parte Virginia from 1880 for the proposition that "in
exercising her rights," a state can neither "disregard the limitations which
the Federal Constitution has applied to her power" nor "deny to the
general government the right to exercise all its granted powers, though
they may interfere with the full enjoyment of rights she would have if
those powers had not been thus granted." 2 16 Ex parte Virginia and
subsequent cases, the Court declared, left "no doubt" that the Constitution
allowed "intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War
Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of
autonomy previously reserved to the States." 217 Abrogation of state
sovereign immunity, the Court concluded, was part and parcel of this
larger principle.2 1 8
But in Quern, decided just three years later, the Court struck a
decidedly different tone. What might explain the inconsistency? A couple
doctrinal possibilities-which could dovetail with ideological,
institutional, or other explanations-bear examining.
As an initial matter, consider that then-Justice William Rehnquist
wrote the majority opinions in both Fitzpatrick and Quern. An
intervening case shows that Justice Rehnquist at first failed to appreciate
the full implications of Fitzpatrick's seemingly permissive approach to
abrogation. Dissenting in Hutto,2 19 he wrote that while Fitzpatrick
involved "a violation of the Equal Protection Clause which is contained
in haec verba in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment itself," the
case at bar involved "the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment,
which is expressly prohibited by the Eighth but not by the Fourteenth

214. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
215. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447-48, 456 (1976).
216. Id. at 454-55 (quotingExparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)).
217. Id. at 455.

218. See id. at 456 ("[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. ... We think that Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate
legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for
private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other
contexts." (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
219. See supratext accompanying notes 141.

§

5)).
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Amendment." 220 It was "not at all clear," Justice Rehnquist said, "that
Congress has the same enforcement power under § 5 with respect to a
constitutional provision which has merely been judicially 'incorporated'
into the Fourteenth Amendment that it has with respect to a provision
which was placed in that Amendment by the drafters." 22 1
Justice Rehnquist's distinction between incorporated and innate
Fourteenth Amendment rights never became part of constitutionalenforcement doctrine. But Hutto hinted at Fitzpatrick's expansive
capacity, suggesting not only that congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity could stretch into the constitutional-tort sphere
(given that the fee dispute under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 derived from a Section
1983 suit222), but that it could enfold the entire universe of claims found
there.
Given that he had "serious reservations" about extending Fitzpatrick's
reasoning beyond the due-process and equal-protection guarantees, 22 3
Justice Rehnquist must have been all the more concerned about extending
Fitzpatrick's reasoning to Quern's circumstances. Quern involved
Illinois's withholding of benefits under a federal-state welfare
program. 22 4 As Edelman explained, the program was organized under the
Social Security Act, 225 which did not include a private cause of action,
but the Court viewed Section 1983 as potentially providing an alternative
path to relief.226 For as the Court would later reason, the fact that Section
1983 supplies a cause of action for violations of "the Constitution and
laws" of the United States means it can be construed to permit relief for
federal constitutional and statutory claims. 227 A holding that Section
1983 abrogated state sovereign immunity in the context of Quern,
therefore, could have opened up states to suit under all manner of
congressional enactments.
There is also a notable degree of path dependence underlying this line
of precedent. Edelman (which Justice Rehnquist also wrote) was the first
decision to say that Section 1983 could not support suits against states
themselves. But the substance of that discussion boiled down to two
sentences. First, the Court stated that "it has not heretofore been
suggested that § 1983 was intended to create a waiver of a State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity merely because an action could be
brought under that section against state officers, rather than against the
220. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 717 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

221. Id. at 717-18.
222. See id. at 693 (majority opinion).
223. Id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
224. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 333-34, 334 n.1 (1979).

225. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
226. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674-75 (1974) (citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.

397 (1970)).
227. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§

1983).
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State itself."2 2 8 Second, the Court restated the general test for determining
whether a remedy contravened sovereign immunity principles, implicitly
rejecting the abrogation argument. Specifically, the Court said that
"[t]hough a § 1983 action may be instituted by public aid recipients . .
a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, and
may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds
from the state treasury."229
Edelman did not discuss whether states were "person[s]" within the
meaning of Section 1983. It did not discuss the statute's roots in the
Fourteenth Amendment. It did not even discuss the statute's role in
vindicating constitutional rights. Instead, Edelman focused at length on
whether Illinois "had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and
consented to the bringing of such a suit by participating in the [welfare]
program." 2 3 0 Answering no, the Court said that "the threshold fact of
congressional authorization to sue a class of defendants which literally
includes States [was] wholly absent," for the Social Security Act "by its
terms did not authorize suit against anyone." 2 3 1 Only then did the Court
briefly turn to Section 1983.232
Given this disposition, the Court in Quern framed the abrogation issue
as whether subsequent decisions "cast . . . doubt on our holding in
Edelman," as whether anything could "justify a conclusion different from
that which we reached in Edelman," and as whether a "reaffirmance of
Edelman" was in order. 2 33 Edelman's idiosyncratic and essentially
unreasoned discussion of Section 1983 thus allowed Quern to start from
a strong presumption that immunity protections would persist,
notwithstanding thatFitzpatrickhad significantly elevated the Fourteenth
Amendment's importance to abrogation doctrine in the interim. By
reifying a decision that rested on air, Quern cut consideration of whether
Section 1983 withdrew states' immunity off at the knees. And in an
apparent effort to avoid allowing any daylight between Section 1983 suits
in federal and state courts, Will perpetuated the path-dependency problem
by straining to pack the entire universe of sovereign immunity
jurisprudence into Section 1983's one-word reference to "person[s]." 234

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Edelman, 415 U.S. at 675-77.
Id. at 677 (citation omitted); see supratext accompanying notes 26-28.
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 671.
Id. at 672, 674.
See id. at 674.
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338, 341, 345 (1979).
See Burnham, supra note 178, at 569-71; Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years of
Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 51, 96 n.183 (1990)

(stating that "[t]he presumption relied on in Will . . extends the (arguably) countermajoritarian
effect of the clear evidence presumption of eleventh amendment cases").
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In sum, a careful reflection on Section 1983 sovereign immunity
decisions reveals that the Court's refusal to view states as cognizable
defendants rests on retroactive reasoning and anachronistic assumptions
that are faulty as a matter of interpretive logic and constitutional
history. 23 5

III. AN AFFIRMATIVE CRITIQUE
So far, the analysis has aimed at examining shortcomings in the
Supreme Court's Section 1983 abrogation jurisprudence. The discussion
has been negative in the sense that it picks apart the reasoning on which
the Court has relied. But where does that leave things?
The preceding negative critique calls for a corresponding affirmative
critique asking how an interpreter should have approached the issue of
Section 1983 actions against states from the start. "[P]erhaps" the Court's
rejection of state suability, while unconvincing as currently constructed,
could "be made" convincing when rebuilt on some alternate foundation,
to quote Will Baude's recent study of the related doctrine of qualified

235. As a response to both these conclusions, one could ask whether the concept of
congressional abrogation and the clear-statement rule to overcome it arose in tandem around the
time the Court decided Parden and Employees in 1964 and 1973, respectively. But if abrogation

is a constitutionally permissible possibility, it should not necessarily matter when commentators
or courts started writing about it. In any event, even a prominent abrogation skeptic acknowledges
based on exhaustive historical research into congressional attitudes about abrogation during
Reconstruction that "[p]robably some Republicans thought, or would have thought if they had
thought about it, that Congress could create causes of action against nonconsenting states." John
Harrison, State Sovereign Immunity and Congress's Enforcement Powers, 2006 SUP. CT. REV.

353, 388. And there is at least one early post-Hans instance of a court discussing the possibility
of "abrogat[ion]" in what appears to be the context in question here. See Brown Univ. v. Rhode
Island Coll. of Agric. & Mech. Arts, 56 F. 55, 58 (C.C.D.R.I. 1893) ("1 shall assume, as contended
by the respondents, that this action may not be maintained if it be, in substance, against the state.
This proposition does not seem to me in any degree to depend on the allegation of 'sovereignty'
in a state, in the strict sense of that word. Sovereignty is an indivisible, inherent attribute, incapable
of any derogation by law, and doubtless involving an immunity from suits or legal proceedings
of any sort. But under the constitution, as originally adopted, a state might be sued by a citizen of
another state, and the eleventh article of amendment does not prohibit a suit by a foreign sovereign
or state against a state of the Union; and it seems that such a suit might now be maintained. So,
too, it is undoubted that a state may now be sued by another state; and, if it be said that the
necessary consent to be sued was involved in the act ratifying the constitution, it may be replied
that without the consent of some certain state the eleventh amendment may now be abrogated,
and the judicial power of the nation may be restored as it was in the beginning, and still further
extended; so that in this respect, as indeed in most, if not all, other respects, the supposed
sovereign is in point of fact subject to a power superior to itself, and covering and including its
whole territory. It may, however, be taken as the general law of the land that suits by private
persons against a state may not be maintained. Into the origin and reason of this rule it is not
necessary, for the present purpose, to inquire." (citations omitted)).
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immunity. 236 Or perhaps the best interpretation of Section 1983 would
abrogate sovereign immunity after all. And any real-world
reconsideration of state suability in constitutional-tort suits would, to
quote Baude again, "explicitly foreground" critical "policy" questions
about whether sovereign immunity in this context "is wise or useful and
about how it interacts with other aspects of our legal regime. "237
Accordingly, this Part presents an affirmative critique of whether
Section 1983 should have been read to abrogate sovereign immunity
more or less from first principles. The purpose is not to advocate any
overarching school of statutory interpretation-but rather to present
evidence that may bear on state suability under different methodological
approaches to greater or lesser degrees. This Part first considers Section
1983's semantic meaning at the time of its enactment and then explores
its expected applications, both for members of Congress as indicated by
the statute's legislative history and for members of the public as indicated
236. See William Baude, Is Quaified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 78-79
(2018) (remarking that "it is possible that the Court could put forward an entirely new legal
argument for qualified immunity," such that "perhaps qualified immunity doctrine c[ould] be
made lawful").

237. Id. Previous scholarship has focused on the policy side of this issue, asking whether
states should be subject to civil accountability for constitutional violations as a normative matter.
See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 100-21 (1983). Work examining this issue
based on a close look at the text and history of Section 1983 seems sparser. Perhaps the most
thorough example presents a point-by-point critique of the Will majority opinion by Professor
Burnham and another lawyer who worked on that case. See Burnham & Fayz, supra note 212, at

10-33. Other work includes shorter or narrower treatments of such issues, including several
discussed here. See, e.g., Englander, John, Note, Amenability of States to Section 1983 Suits, 62
B.U. L. REV. 731, 754-59 (1982) (relying on the purposes of the Reconstruction Amendments,

the purposes and legislative history of Section 1983, the Dictionary Act, and statements inMonell
and Quern to argue that states should be considered "persons" under Section 1983); Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the
Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 447 n.166 (1990) (stating that "[t]he legislative history of

§ 1983, as well as the plain language and understanding underlying the Dictionary Act of
1871 ... demonstrate Congress ... had the states' interest in mind when Congress decided to
subject the states to damage actions in federal court through § 1983" and that "[t]he history of
Reconstruction . .. demonstrates that Congress held the states responsible for the violence in 1871
against the newly freed slaves and their supporters and, therefore, made the states the primary
target of § 1983"); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: BalancingFederalism Concerns and

Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 561-62 (1989) (similar);
John E. Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes of Action Against State
Governments and the History of the Eleventh and FourteenthAmendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV.

1413, 1464-68 (1975) (concluding on the basis of legislative history that "section 1983 was not
intended to create private causes of action against state governments"); Gene R. Shreve,
Symmetries ofAccess in Civil Rights Litigation: Politics, Pragmatismand Will, 66 IND. L.J. 1, 18
& n.98 (1990) (briefly contending that "[b]oth sides in Will clothed their arguments in
intentionalist language, yet as in Quern, neither side could muster convincing evidence about what
Congress intended for section 1983 in damage actions" and stating that "[i]t seems doubtful
whether adequate evidence exists").
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by its litigation history. The subsequent Part then focuses on the policy
side of the question.
A. Semantic Meaning
As the Supreme Court recently stated, "In the absence of an express
statutory definition, the Court applies a 'longstanding interpretive
presumption that "person" does not include the sovereign. "'238 This
presumption purportedly comports with the directive of the present-day
Dictionary Act, which provides that "the word "'person" . . include[s]
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and
joint stock companies, as well as individuals.' 23 9 By negative
implication, the Court says, this definition does not include governments
themselves. 2 40
Like most presumptions, this one is rebuttable. 24 1 The Dictionary Act
provides that its definitions control "[i]n determining the meaning of any
Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise." 242 And the
Court "normally interprets a statute in accord with the ordinary public
meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment. "243 As the Court
explained last year, this task requires the Justices to "orient [them]selves
to the time of the statute's adoption . .. and begin by examining the key
statutory terms." 244 The analysis here considers evidence consistent with
that general approach and then discusses how a range of interpretive
philosophies might apply to the issue of state suability under Section
1983.

238. Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1861-62 (2019) (quoting Vt.
Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780-81 (2000)).

239. Id. at 1862 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1). Of note, the Dictionary Act
included the same definition of "person" when the Court decided Edelman, Quern, and Will. See
Michael J. Gerardi, Note, The "Person"at FederalLaw: A Framework and a RICO Test Suite,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2239, 2251 (2009) ("Congress restyled the language . . in 1948 into the

modern definition: '[U]nless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words "person" and
"whoever" include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies, as well as individuals .... .' (alterations in original) (quoting Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 645,

§ 6,

62 Stat. 683, 859 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C.

§

1))).

240. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947) ("The absence of
any comparable provision extending the term to sovereign governments implies that Congress did
not desire the term to extend to them.").
241. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1941) ("Since, in common

usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are
ordinarily construed to exclude it. But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion." (footnote
omitted)), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C.
Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736 (2004).

§ 15a, as recognized in U.S. Postal

242. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).
243. Bostockv. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020).
244. Id. at 1738-39.

Serv. v. Flamingo
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1. The Dictionary Act's 1871 Definition
With respect to Section 1983, the time of the statute's adoption was
Reconstruction, and the key statutory term for present purposes is
"person." When the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted, the Dictionary
Act (in its very first iteration) defined "person" differently from how it
does today, specifying that the word could "extend and be applied to
bodiespolitic andcorporate . . unless the context shows that such words
were intended to be used in a more limited sense."2 4 5 Congress adopted
this definition on February 25, 1871, less than two months before it
adopted Section 1983 in April. 246 So absent some contraindication, the
"person[s]" to whom Section 1983 referred would have included "bodies
politic and corporate." The questions become, therefore, first, whether
some contraindication surrounding Section 1983 existed and second,
whether states fell within the class of "bodies politic and corporate."
As for the initial question, assuming for the moment that "bodies
politic and corporate" would have included states, at least three semantic
possibilities indicating that Section 1983 may have encoded a narrower
meaning of "person" are apparent. 247 First, in both Quern and Will, the
majority suggested that the 1871 Dictionary Act definition was
unilluminating because it postdated the use of "person" in Section 2 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,248 which served as a model for the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.249 But the earlier statute used "person" to delineate
the target of criminal sanctions,250 and there appears to have been little if
245. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71,

§ 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C.

§ 1) (emphasis added).
246. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 355-56 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).

247. To dispose of an additional potential contraindication off the bat, the fact that Section

1983 targets violations of "the Constitution and laws" of the United States should not cause one
to think the statute initially excluded states from its coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
For "[a]s originally enacted in 1871, the provision that is now § 1983 created a cause of action
only for the deprivation of constitutionalrights." FALLON ET AL., supra note 43, at 1009; see supra
note 12. As it turns out, "[t]he phrase 'and laws' was added, without helpful explanation, as part
of a revision of the statutes in 1874." Id.
248. Ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1443).
249. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989); Quern, 440 U.S. at 341

n. 11.
250.

§

2, 14 Stat., at 27 ("[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,

regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or
Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different
punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any time been held in a
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the
punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall
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any doubt even then that states could not commit crimes. 251 It would have
been immediately clear from the subject matter, therefore, that a state
could not have counted as a "person." That was not true of the later
statute, which used "person" to delineate the target of civil sanctions, so
the subject matter said far less about whether a state could count as a
"person."252
Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found cause to interpret
statutes differently from prior statutes on which they were modeled. 2 53
Monroe provides an especially pertinent example, for there the Court
concluded that provisions flowing from the 1866 Act and the 1871 Act
encoded separate state-of-mind requirements in part because of their
respective criminal and civil subject matters. 25 Also relevant is a recent
case ascribing "person" divergent meanings. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Community,255 the Court rejected the argument that because
the private right of action provided by the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 256 "was modeled after § 4 of the
Clayton Act, which we have held allows recovery for injuries suffered
abroad as a result of antitrust violations," RICO-in a provision
"allow[ing] '[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of

be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year,
or both, in the discretion of the court." (emphases added)).
251. See Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation,18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 463 (2009)
(discussing this understanding among Reconstruction congressmen).
252. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 43, at 907-08 (discussing how "[t]he Marshall Court

generally construed the Eleventh Amendment narrowly" and how important "open questions
about the Eleventh Amendment" existed "nearly until the end of the nineteenth century").
253. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 n.2 (2009) (rejecting the

argument that "the Court must incorporate its past interpretations of Title VII [of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964] into the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)] because 'the substantive
provisions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII' and because the Court has
frequently applied its interpretations of Title VII to the ADEA" (quoting id. at 183 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)); id. (reasoning that "the Court's approach to interpreting the ADEA in light of Title
VII has not been uniform" and that "[i]n this instance, ... textual differences between Title VII
and the ADEA . . . prevent us from applying [Title VII precedent] to federal age discrimination
claims").
254. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) ("In Screws [v. United States] we dealt

with a statute that imposed criminal penalties for acts 'wilfully' done. We construed that word in
its setting to mean the doing of an act with 'a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right."'
(quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945))), overruledin partby Monell v. Dep't

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); id. ("We do not think that gloss should be placed on [Section
1983] which we have here. The word 'wilfully' does not appear in [Section 1983]. Moreover,
[Section 1983] provides a civil remedy, while in the Screws case we dealt with a criminal law
challenged on the ground of vagueness. Section [1983] should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.").
255. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
256. Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX,
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968).

§ 901(a),

84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18
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a violation of [a specific section] to sue in federal district court"257must
have allowed suits for injuries suffered abroad too. 258 The Court
explained that its holding about the Clayton Act 259 "relied first and
foremost on the fact that the Clayton Act's definition of 'person'-which
in turn defines who may sue under that Act-'explicitly includes
"corporations and associations existing under or authorized by . . the
laws of any foreign country.""' 26 0 RICO, the Court said, "lacks the
language" previously "found critical ,"261 notwithstanding (as a separate
opinion pointed out) that "RICO's definition of 'persons' is hardly
confining: 'any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property. '262
A second issue concerns the appearance of the phrase "under color of
state [law]" within the same sentence as the word "person" in Section
1983. As the majority put the point in Will, "if a State is a 'person' within
the meaning of § 1983, the section is to be read as saying that 'every
person, including a State, who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects .... "'263 This, the Court said, "would be a decidedly
awkward way of expressing an intent to subject the States to liability."264
But to quote Justice Brennan's response, Section 1983 extends not only
to states, but "as well to natural persons, who do not necessarily" act
under color of state law. 26 5 "[T]o ensure that they would be liable only
when they did so," Justice Brennan continued, "the statute needed the
under-color-of-law requirement. "266 In other words, the choice to use
"person" to include states was concise, not cumbersome.2 67
A third related issue involves the reoccurrence of "person" later in the
same sentence under examination here. Recall that Section 1 of the Civil
257. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2097 (second alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 1964(c)).
258. Id. at 2109 (citation omitted).

259. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§§ 12-27 and 29 U.S.C.

§§

52-53).
260. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2109-10 (third alteration in original) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v.
Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313 (1978)).

261. Id. at 2110.
262. Id. at 2114 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

263. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (alteration in original)
(quoting
264.
265.
266.

42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Id.
Id. at 83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.

267. See id. ("The only way to remove the redundancy that the Court sees would have been
to eliminate the catchall phrase 'person' altogether, and separately describe each category of
possible defendants and the circumstances under which they might be liable. I cannot think of a
situation not involving the Eleventh Amendment, however, in which we have imposed such an
unforgiving drafting requirement on Congress.").
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Rights Act of 1871 provided for civil suit against "any person" acting
under color of state law who violated the constitutional rights of "any
person" in the United States. 268 One could argue that the latter reference
to "person[s]" embraces individuals only, 269 such that the consistentusage canon-that is, the presumption "that Congress uses the same
words or phrases consistently across different parts of the same
statute"27 0-means the former reference does too. But even assuming the
premise, the conclusion does not necessarily follow. For the consistentusage canon states a relatively weak presumption and seems relatively
weak as a descriptive matter.27 1 Moreover, there is little reason to think
the latter appearance of "person" provided a better indication of what the
former appearance of "person" meant than the actual statutory definition
of that term did.
As for the next question outlined above (whether states counted as
"bodies politic and corporate" when Section 1983 was enacted), the
historical record suggests that the phrase was somewhat ambiguous but
would probably have been widely understood to include states. In Quern,
Justice Brennan argued that the 1871 Dictionary Act supported state
suability under Section 1983, providing bare citations to thirteen judicial
opinions coming mostly from the Supreme Court and clustered largely
within a few decades of Section 1983's enactment. 272 Reviewing these
opinions shows they all indeed refer to states as "bodies politic" and/or
"corporate"-or describe them using language that seems functionally
equivalent. 273 In Quern, Justice Brennan also cited the Preamble to the
268. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22,

§

§ 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

1983) (emphases added); see supra note 12.
269. See Municipality of San Sebastian v. Puerto Rico, 89 F. Supp. 3d 266, 276 (D.P.R.)

(explaining that "[s]ince Monell, the courts of appeals have been divided as to whether a
municipality is a proper section 1983 plaintiff' and collecting citations), on reconsideration in
part, 116 F. Supp. 3d 49 (D.P.R. 2015).

270. John F. Manning, Essay, Inside Congress's Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1911, 1938
(2015).
271. See Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) ("Most

words have different shades of meaning and consequently may be variously construed, not only
when they occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even
in the same section. Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. But the presumption is not
rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are
used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act
with different intent." (citation omitted)).
272. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).

273. See Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 188 (1915) ("The basic principle of the decision of
the Court of Appeals was that the State is a recognized unit and those who are not citizens of it
are not members of it. Thus recognized it is a body corporate and, like any other body corporate,
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Massachusetts Constitution and the writings of Justice James Wilson,27 4

it may enter into contracts and hold and dispose of property." (quotation mark omitted));
McPhersonv. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 24 (1892) ("The manner of the appointment of electors directed
by the act of Michigan is the election of an elector and an alternate elector in each of the twelve
Congressional districts into which the State of Michigan is divided, and of an elector and an
alternate elector at large in each of two districts defined by the act. It is insisted that it was not
competent for the legislature to direct this manner of appointment because the State is to appoint
as a body politic and corporate, and so must act as a unit and cannot delegate the authority to
subdivisions created for the purpose .... "); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 288 (1885)
("The State is a political corporate body, can act only through agents, and can command only by
laws."); Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1878) ("The political society which in 1796 became
a State of the Union, by the name of the State of Tennessee, is the same which is now represented
as one of those States in the Congress of the United States. Not only is it the same body politic
now, but it has always been the same."); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876) (in discussing

states' powers, stating that "' [a] body politic,' as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution
of Massachusetts, 'is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen,
and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common
good"'); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50, 76-77 (1867) (calling a state "an organized political
body" and discussing its "corporate existence"); Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229,
231 (1850) ("Every sovereign State is of necessity a body politic, or artificial person, and as such
capable of making contracts and holding property, both real and personal."); Butler v.
Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 416 (1850) ("[Contracts] are clearly distinguishable from

measures or engagements adopted or undertaken by the body politic or State government for the
benefit of all, and from the necessity of the case, and according to universal understanding, to be
varied or discontinued as the public good shall require."); id. at 416-17 ("[I]n every perfect or
competent government, there must exist a general power to enact and to repeal laws; and to create,
and change or discontinue, the agents designated for the execution of those laws. Such a power is
indispensable for the preservation of the body politic, and for the safety of the individuals of the
community. It is true, that this power, or the extent of its exercise, may be controlled by the higher
organic law or constitution of the State .... "); Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54,
93 (1795) (opinion of Iredell, J.) ("A distinction was taken at the bar between a State and the
people of the State. It is a distinction I am not capable of comprehending. By a State forming a
Republic (speaking of it as a moral person) I do not mean the Legislature of the State, the
Executive of the State, or the Judiciary, but all the citizens which compose that State, and are, if
I may so express myself, integral parts of it; all together forming a body politic." (emphasis
omitted)); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall). 419, 447 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.) ("Any
body politic (sole or aggregate) whether its power be restricted or transcendant, is . ...a
corporation.' ... In this extensive sense, not only each State singly, but even the United States
may without impropriety be termed 'corporations."'), superseded by constitutionalamendment,

U.S. CONST. amend. XI; id. at 468 (opinion of Cushing, J.) ("[A]ll States whatever are
corporations or bodies politic."); Utah State Bldg. Comm'n v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 140 P.2d
763, 766 (Utah 1943) (collecting definitions of "body politic," "body corporate," and "body
corporate and politic" indicating that "the state" and other public entities could qualify); Comm'rs
of Hamilton Cnty. v. Noyes, 5 Ohio Dec. Reprint 238, 240 (Super. Ct. 1874) ("In this state, we

have but two classes of political corporations, the state of Ohio constituting the one and municipal
corporations the other."), aff'd sub nom. Comm'r of Hamilton Cnty. v. Noyes, 5 Ohio Dec.
Reprint 281 (Super. Ct. 1875), aff'd sub nom. Bd. of Comm'rs of Hamilton Cnty. v. Noyes, 35

Ohio St. 201 (1878).
274. Quern, 440 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

RECONSIDERING SECTION 1983'S NONABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

2021 ]

563

which characterize states in the same manner. 275 And Justice Brennan
noted that "during the very debates surrounding the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act [of 1871], States were referred to as bodies politic and
corporate." 27 6 When the issue came up again in Will, moreover, Justice
Brennan added two classic law dictionaries-which likewise include
states within the scope of "bodies politic" and/or "corporate" 277-and two
cases (one written by Chief Justice Marshall) stating that "[t]he United
States is a government, and, consequently, a body politic and corporate"
to his list of citations. 278
Independent research confirms that states were often called "bodies
politic," with or without reference to "bodies corporate" or the like,
between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. A Senate
resolution proposed in 1862 seeking to abolish slavery in states that had
voted or otherwise acted to leave the Union, for example, said that "the
treason" of secessionist conduct "works an instant forfeiture of all those
functions and powers essential to the continued existence of the State as
275. See MASS. CONST. pmbl. ("The end of the institution, maintenance, and administration

of government, is to secure the existence of the body politic, to protect it, and to furnish the
individuals who compose it with the power of enjoying in safety and tranquility their natural
rights, and the blessings of life .... The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of
individuals: it is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common
good.");

1

JAMES WILSON

& BIRD WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON,

L.L.D. 304-05 (Philadelphia, Lorenzo Press 1804) ("In order to constitute a state, it is

indispensably necessary, that the wills and the power of all the members be united in such a
manner, that they shall never act nor desire but one and the same thing, in whatever relates to the
end, for which the society is established. It is from this union of wills and of strength, that the
state or body politick results."); id. at 305 ("Smaller societies may be formed within a state by a
part of its members.... To these societies the name of corporations is generally appropriated,
though somewhat improperly; for the term is strictly applicable to supreme as well as to inferiour
bodies politick."); id. at 306 (" [I]n the United States, transactions have happened, which bear the
nearest resemblance to this political idea, of any, of which history has preserved the account or
the memory.").
276. Quern, 440 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 661-62 (1871) (statement of Sen. Vickers) ("What is a State? Is it not abody

politic and corporate?"); id. at 696 (statement of Sen. Edmunds) ("A State is a corporation .... ")).
277. See

1 JOHN

BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 185

(11th ed., Philadelphia, George W. Childs 1866) (providing the following definitions, inter alia,
of "body politic": first, "[w]hen applied to the government, this phrase signifies the state"; second,
"[w]hen it refers to corporations, the term body politic means that the members of such
corporations shall be considered as an artificial person"); WALTER A. SHUMAKER & GEORGE
FOSTER LONGSDORF, THE CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF LAW

104

(1901) (defining "body politic"

as "[t]he old term for a corporation" and noting that the term was also "[a]pplied generally to the
state or nation"); id. (defining "body corporate" as "[a] corporation"); United States v. Maurice,
26 F. Cas. 1211, 1216 (C.C. Va. 1823) (Marshall, C.J.); Van Brocklinv. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151,
154 (1886) (quoting Maurice, 26 F. Cas. at 1216).
278. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 78 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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a body politic, so that . .
the State . . ceases to exist." 279 Another
example comes from an 1897 decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana,
which specifically held that the state was a "person" within the meaning
of a statute providing that "the word 'person' extends to bodies politic
and corporate."2 8 0 Similar illustrations exist in a variety of sources. 28 1
279. S. JOURNAL, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 194-95 (1862) (emphasis omitted).
280. Ervin v. State ex rel. Walley, 48 N.E. 249, 251 (Ind. 1897) (noting that "Webster defines

the words 'body politic' to be 'the collective body of a nation or state as politically organized, or
as exercising political functions; also a corporation"').
281. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, 14th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. 102 (Fla. 1866) (objecting to the
Fourteenth Amendment's proposed ratification on the ground that "[firom the moment of its
engraftment upon the Constitution of the United States, the States would in effect cease to exist
as bodies politic"), quoted in Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1627, 1650 (2013); C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New
Territories, 12 HARv. L. REV. 365, 369 (1899) ("The State of New York furnishes a good

illustration of the two senses in which the term 'United States' is used under the Constitution; for
the style of that State, as a body politic, is 'The People of the State of New York,' and the members
of that body politic are the citizens of the State. The term 'people,' therefore, in that State, means,
first, all the citizens of the State in the aggregate (i.e., the members of the body politic), and,
secondly, the body politic itself; and while in the former sense it is plural, in the latter sense it is
singular."). The Rhode Island Royal Charter-which was dated July 8, 1663, and remained "in
force until the Constitution, adopted in November 1842, became operative on the first Tuesday of
May, 1843"-also referred to the colony and its inhabitants by these terms. See, e.g., R.I. DEP'T
OF STATE, Rhode Island Royal Charter Granted by King Charles H,
1663,
https://catalog.sos.ri.gov/repositories/2/archival objects/2136
[https://perma.cc/9AE9-9LNJ]
(allowing the people of the colony "to create and make them a body politic or corporate, with the
powers and privileges hereinafter mentioned"); id. (declaring that a long list of individuals and
"all such others as now are, or hereafter shall be, admitted and made free of the company and
society of our colony of Providence Plantations ... shall be, from time to time, and forever
hereafter, a body corporate and politic, in fact and name, by the name of the Governor and
Company of the English Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations"). And given the
Massachusetts Constitution's usage of "body politic," see supra note 275 and accompanying text,
it may also be significant that a Massachusetts statute appears to have served as the template for
the definition of "person" in the 1871 Dictionary Act. See GENERAL STATUTES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ch. 3, § 7, at 50, 51 (William White, Boston 1860) ("In the
construction of statutes the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the same
statute, that is to say: ... [t]he word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and
corporate." (citing Commonwealth v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 25, 45 (1849) (relying

on the fact that "the preamble of the constitution sets forth that instrument, as the mode of forming
the inhabitants of the commonwealth into a body politic" to suggest that a previous statutory
definition whereby "the word 'person"' could "extend and be applied to bodies politic and
corporate, as well as to individuals" may have embraced Massachusetts), overruled in part by
New Haven & Northampton Co. v. Northampton, 102 Mass. 116 (1869))); CONG. GLOBE, 41st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2465 (1870) (statement of Rep. Poland) (remarking that "I believe I copied the
section [in the 1871 Dictionary Act stating that 'words importing the masculine gender may be
applied to females']"-which was the same as the section articulating the definition of "person,"
see Ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (1871) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1)-"literally from a
general provision in the revised statutes of Massachusetts"); see also Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Cure
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The Will majority "disagree[d]" with Justice Brennan that "'the phrase
2 82
"bodies politic and corporate" was understood to include the States."'
Instead, the majority argued, "an examination of authorities of the era
suggests that the phrase was used to mean corporations, both private and
public (municipal), and not to include the States." 283 But while the
sources the majority cited generally call municipalities "bodies politic"
and/or "corporate" or, again, describe them using language that seems
functionally equivalent, 2 84 they do not indicate that those terms were
necessarily or even usually understood to exclude states. 28 5 Indeed, as
Justice Brennan noted, 2 86 most specifically say that the terms included
states.287
Without A Disease: The Emerging Doctrine of Successor Liability in International Trade
Regulation, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 127, 146 & n.90 (2006) (discussing this legislative history and

stating that 1 U.S.C. § 1, "originally known as the Dictionary Act, was likely copied from a
Massachusetts statute").
282. 491 U.S. at 69 (quoting id. at 78 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
283. Id.
284. See id. at 69 n.9.

285. One case and one law dictionary the majority cited do not say the phrases can include
states. See United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 321 (1876) ("The term 'person' as . .

used [in a

New York statute] applies to natural persons, and also to artificial persons,-bodies politic,
deriving their existence and powers from legislation,-but cannot be so extended as to include
within its meaning the Federal government. It would require an express definition to that effect to
give it a sense thus extended. And [according to the New York Court of Appeals,] the term
'corporation' in the statute applies only to such corporations as are created under the laws of the
state.");

1 ALEXANDER M.

BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed., New York,

Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1871) (defining "body corporate" as a "corporation" and "body politic" as
a "term applied to a corporation, which is usually designated as a body corporateandpolitic" and
a "body to take in succession, framed by policy"). But the law dictionary, as Brennan noted, Will,
491 U.S. at 79-80, says that "body politic" was "[p]articularly applied, in the old books, to a
corporation sole," BURRILL, supra, at 212, which the same source indicates included "the
sovereign in England" but was "rare" in the United States, id. at 383 (defining "corporation sole"
as a "corporation consisting of one person only, and his successors in some particular station, who
are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly
that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they would not have had").
286. See Will, 491 U.S. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[E]ach and every dictionary cited by

the Court accords a broader realm-one that comfortably, and in most cases explicitly, includes
the sovereign-to th[e] phrase ['bodies politic and corporate'] than the Court gives it today.").
287. One dictionary on which the majority relied gives the first definition of "body politic"
as "[t]he governmental, sovereign power: a city or a State." WILIAM C. ANDERSON, A
DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 1893). Later, it says that "'[b]ody corporate

and politic' is said, in the older books, to be the most exact expression for a public corporation or
corporation having powers of government." Id. It also defines "body corporate or corporate body"
as "[a]n artificial body; a corporation." Id. Another dictionary to which the majority pointed
begins its definition of "body politic" by saying that "[a] public corporation, or corporation having
powers of government, is frequently spoken of as a body politic; and, in older books, 'body
corporate and politic' is said to be the most exact expression for a corporation of this character."

1

BENJAMIN VAUGHAN ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR
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What about the "longstanding interpretive presumption that 'person'
does not include the sovereign," referenced above? 28 8 This came up in
Will as well. "At the very least," the majority said, "reading [Section 1983
as including states] is not so clearly indicated that it provides reason to
depart from the often-expressed understanding that 'in common usage,
the term "person" does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes
employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it."' 289 This
presumption, Justice Brennan responded, pertained "only to the 'enacting
sovereign."'290 Both the cases Justice Brennan cited and other scholarship
support this intuitive proposition, 291 although the majority was able to
point to a recent case applying the presumption to the phrase "white

ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1879). But it then goes on to say that

"body politic is often used in a general way, as meaning the state or the sovereign power, or the
city government, without implying any distinct express incorporation." Id. This dictionary also
defines "body corporate" as a phrase that "was formerly much used to mean an artificial person"
but that had been "replaced" by "corporation." Id. A third dictionary the majority put forwardthe first edition of what is now called Black's Law Dictionary-saysthat a "body politic" is "[a]
term applied to a corporation, which is usually designated as a 'body corporate and politic"' and
that "[t]he term is particularly appropriate to a public corporation invested with powers and duties
of government." HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 143 (West Publ'g Co. 1891).
It proceeds to say, however, that "body politic" is also "often used, in a rather loose way, to
designate the state or nation or sovereign power, or the government of a county or municipality,
without distinctly connoting any express and individual corporate character." Id.
288. Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1861-62 (2019) (quoting Vt.
Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780-81 (2000)); see supra
text accompanying note 238.

289. Will, 491 U.S. at 64 (second and third alterations in original).
290. Id. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175,
186 (1936)).
291. See California,297 U.S. at 186-87 ("Respondent invokes the canon of construction that

a sovereign is presumptively not intended to be bound by its own statute unless named in
it .... We can perceive no reason for extending [this principle] so as to exempt a business carried
on by a state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-embracing in
scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being obstructed by state as by individual
action. Language and objectives so plain are not to be thwarted by resort to a rule of construction
whose purpose is but to resolve doubts, and whose application in the circumstances would be
highly artificial."); Jefferson Cnty. Pharm. Ass'nv. Abbott Lab'ys, 460 U.S. 150, 161 n.21 (1983)
(stating that previous cases "suggest that this sovereign-exception rule of statutory construction
simply means that a government, when it passes a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders";
citing the passage from California quoted supra; and refusing to apply the rule to exempt state
activity from congressional regulation); Burnham & Fayz, supra note 212, at 11 (stating that "[i]n
a consistent line of cases from the turn of the century through 1983, the Court relied on ordinary
rules of statutory construction to find that states are 'persons' in a host of federal statutes" and
collecting citations); id. at 13 ("The case law relied upon in Will does support a presumption
against inclusion of 'the sovereign' in statutes. However, this rule has no applicability to states'
inclusion in federal statutes such as section 1983, because the only 'sovereign' which it excludes
is the enacting sovereign, e.g., the United States."); id. at 13 n.76 (tracing the rule's history).
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person" to exclude a state. 2 92 In any event, Justice Brennan continued, the
Court made clear just three years after Section 1983's passage that "even
the principle as applied to the enacting sovereign" does not apply
"[w]here an act of Parliament is made for the public good, as for the
advancement of religion and justice or to prevent injury and wrong. "'293
As Justice Brennan concluded, "[i]t would be difficult to imagine a statute
more clearly designed 'for the public good,' and 'to prevent injury and
wrong,' than § 1983."294
On balance, the evidence that in 1871 states fit well within the phrase
"bodies politic and corporate" appears to outweigh the evidence that they
did not.2 95 And that makes sense given that some uses of the word
"person" in federal statutes simply must have included states-including
in places where the word refers to parties in litigation. Take the judicial
oath, for instance. Federal statutes have required judges to pledge that
they "will administer justice without respect to persons" ever since the
enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789.296 Surely the term "persons" in
these statutes has always included states, which the Constitution has
always envisioned appearing as litigants in federal court. 297

292. See Will, 491 U.S. at 64 ("In Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, we followed this rule in
construing the phrase 'white person' contained in 25 U.S.C. § 194 as not including the 'sovereign
States of the Union"' (quoting 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979)).
293. Id. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
251, 255 (1874)); see also United States v. Knight, 39 U.S. 301, 315 (1840).
294. Will, 491 U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

295. One could argue that "bodies politic and corporate" should be construed as a single term
of art, not as a phrase comprising two separate concepts (bodies politic and bodies corporate).
This seems possible, but contemporary evidence supports a contrary position. A set of
commissioners tasked with codifying federal laws around that time wrote of the 1871 Dictionary
Act definition that "if the phrase 'bodies politic' is precisely equivalent to 'corporations,' it is
redundant; but if, on the contrary, 'body politic' is somewhat broader, . . . then the provision goes
further than is convenient"-in both instances viewing "bodies politic" and "bodies corporate" as
separate concepts (albeit ones that might be duplicative).

1 REVISION

OF THE UNITED STATES

19 (1872); see
infra text accompanying notes 300-311. And even if "bodies politic and corporate" was
something like a hendiadys, the evidence does not necessarily show that it excluded states. See
STATUTES AS DRAFTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE

Samuel L. Bray, "Necessary and Proper" and "Cruel and Unusual": Hendiadys in the
Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 695 (2016) ("Hendiadys is a figure of speech in which two

terms, separated by a conjunction, are melded together to form a single complex expression.").
After all, several sources cited above refer to states as bodies "politic and corporate" or "corporate
and politic." See supra notes 273, 276; supratext accompanying note 280.

296. See ch. 20, § 8, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (emphasis added). The current version of the judicial oath
traces back to the enactment of the Judicial Code of 1948. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,

§ 453,

62 Stat. 869, 907 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 453).
297. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend," inter

alia, "to Controversies between two or more States; ... between a State and Citizens of another
State; . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects"),
amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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2. The Dictionary Act's 1874 Definition
Justice Brennan's Will dissent briefly raises-and tries to deflect
another issue regarding the Dictionary Act. "[I]t is a matter of small
importance," Justice Brennan argued, that the "definition of 'person' as
including bodies politic and corporate was retroactively withdrawn when
the federal statutes were revised in 1874.",298 For when "determining
Congress' intent in using this term" in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 two
months after including "bodies politic and corporate" within the
Dictionary Act's description of "person," Justice Brennan continued, "it
cannot be decisive that, three years later, it withdrew th[e] presumption"
that such entities would qualify. 2 99
Whatever the Dictionary Act in 1874 said "person" meant, that
definition seems potentially more relevant to how one should read
Section 1983 than Justice Brennan credited. For while Justice Brennan
was focused on "Congress' intent," the amendment to the Dictionary Act
in 1874 could say something about the meaning of the word "person" to
wider audiences, including the general public in 1871 or afterward.
In fact, the story behind the 1874 shift in the federal statutory
definition of "person" is a fascinating but confounding one-and with
respect to this particular provision, a story that appears never to have been
told before. In 1866, acting pursuant to congressional authorization,
President Andrew Johnson "appoint[ed] three persons, learned in the law,
as commissioners, to revise, simplify, arrange, and consolidate all statutes
of the United States, general and permanent in their nature. "300 After
toiling for years with several illustrious members, including a previous
U.S. Attorney General and future Supreme Court nominee, the
commission submitted its work to a joint congressional committee in
early 1873.301
Unfortunately for the commissioners, "[i]t was the opinion of the joint
committee that [they] had so changed and amended the statutes that it
would be impossible to secure the passage of their revision. "302
Accordingly, the joint committee selected Thomas Jefferson Durant, "an
accomplished member of the Supreme Court bar and Louisiana unionist
during the War," to finish the codification project. 303 Durant reported

298. Will, 491 U.S. at 81 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 81-82.
300. Revision of Statutes Acts of 1866, ch. 140, § 1, 14 Stat. 74, 74-75 (1866); see Ralph H.

Dwan & Ernest R. Feidler, The FederalStatutes Their History and Use, 22 MINN. L. REV. 1008,
1013 (1938).
301. Dwan & Feidler, supra note 300, at 1013; Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on
a JurisdictionalTheme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469, 517 & n.196 (1989).
302. Id.
303. Goldstein, supra note 301, at 518.
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back in December 1873,304 and Congress ordered his work printed as the
Revised Statutes of the United States in June 1874.305 As part of this
process, Congress repealed all preexisting public laws and enacted
Durant's compilation in their place. 306
The Dictionary Act that Congress had approved on February 25, 1871,
said that "in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word 'person' may extend
and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . .. unless the context
shows that such words were intended to be used in a more limited
sense." 307 The Dictionary Act in the 1874 revision, by contrast, said that
"[i]n determining the meaning of the revised statutes, or of any act or
resolution of Congress passed subsequent to February [25, 1871], . . . the
word 'person' may extend and be applied to partnerships and
corporations. . unless the context shows that such words were intended
to be used in a more limited sense." 30 8
Who changed the relevant language from "bodies politic and
corporate," which likely included states, to "partnerships and
corporations," which less likely did so? The original commissioners. And
for what reason? Notes the commissioners printed in 1872 disclose that
they thought "that partnerships ought to be included; and that if the phrase
'bodies politic' is precisely equivalent to 'corporations,' it is redundant;
but if, on the contrary, 'body politic' is somewhat broader, . . . then the
provision goes further than is convenient." 30 9 Significantly, they
identified their specific concern as the possibility that "body politic"
could "be understood to include a government, such as a State." 3 10 This,
they said, "requires the draughtsman, in the majority of cases of
employing the word 'person,' to take care that States, Territories, foreign
governments, &c., appear to be excluded." 3 1 1
The commissioners' notes provide strong support for the notion that
"bodies politic" in the specific setting of the 1871 Dictionary Act would
have been regularly (even if not uniformly) understood to include states.
That reading of the phrase was so natural, the commissioners thought,
304. See THOMAS J. DURANT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ON THE REVISION OF THE LAWS 1 (1873).

305. See Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 333, § 3, 18 Stat., pt. 3, 113, 113.
306. Dwan & Feidler, supra note 300, at 1012.

307. Ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (1871) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1) (emphasis
added).
308. Revised Statutes of 1874, § 1, 18 Stat., pt. 1, 1, 1 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1)
(emphasis added).
309. 1 REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES STATUTES AS DRAFTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS
APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE 19 (1872).
310. Id.
311. Id.; see also Gerardi, supra note 239, at 2250-51 n.52. A year after Will, the Supreme

Court relied on these notes to hold that territories are not suable "persons" under Section 1983.
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 191-92 (1990).
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that statutory drafters were "require[d]" to "exclude[]" states where
Congress did not want them covered. That the commissioners believed
such exclusions necessary "in the majority of cases of employing the
word 'person"' speaks at least as much to the strength (rather than any
weakness) of the connection between states and "bodies politic." For if
states were not regularly understood to qualify, excepting them would
have been unnecessary.
Critically, the commissioners' notes also help show that Congress
almost certainly enacted the new definition of "person" by mistake
meaning with most (or maybe even all) members believing there was no
new definition of "person" included in the revision at all. The notes show
that the commission intentionally changed the Dictionary Act's entry for
"person." 3 12 And the whole point of Congress "hand[ing] over" the
project to Durant was "so that he might expunge all changes in the law
made by the commission." 3 13 Durant said that he sought to do just that.
In explaining his drafting process, for instance, Durant wrote to Congress
that
[e]very section reported by the commissioners has been
compared with the text of the corresponding act or portion
of the act of Congress referred to, and wherever it has been
found that a section contained any departure from the
meaning of Congress as expressed in the Statutes at Large,
such change has been made as was necessary to restore the
original signification. 314
What is more, the members of the House Committee on the Revision of
the Laws, who were checking over Durant's work, repeatedly reassured
their congressional colleagues that "there is not known to the committee
a change of a syllable or of a comma of the statutes so as to change their
effect." 315
312. In the commissioners' defense, as the chairman of the House Committee on the
Revision of the Laws explained, "[b]y the original law of 1866, under which the commissioners
were appointed, they were authorized to make changes to some extent." 2 CONG. REC. 646 (1874)

(statement of Rep. Poland). In the chairman's opinion, the commissioners "probably" did not
"avail[] themselves" of that "liberty" more "than they were warranted in doing." Id. The joint
committee, he said, simply "came to the conclusion that within the limited time that could be
allowed for the work in th[e] House, it would be utterly impossible to carry the measure through,
if it was understood that it contained new legislation." Id.
313. Dwan & Feidler, supra note 300, at 1013-14.
314. DURANT, supra note 304, at 1.
315. 2 CONG. REC. 820 (1874) (statement of Rep. Hoar); see also, e.g., id. at 129 (statement
of Rep. Butler) ("[Y]our committee felt it their bounden duty not to allow, so far as they could
ascertain, any change of the law. This embodies the law as it is. The temptation, of course, was
very great, where a law seemed to be imperfect, to perfect it by the alteration of words or phrases,
or to make some change. But that temptation has, so far as I know and believe, been resisted. We
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Nevertheless, Durant preserved the commission's change to the
definition of "person," and the House committee seems not to have
caught (or at least not to have drawn any attention to) the discrepancy
with the Statutes at Large. Seemingly shorn of the commissioners'
explanatory notes, 3 16 and seemingly with no clear indication that anything
was amiss, 3 17 Durant's apparently erroneous rendering of the Dictionary
Act was enacted by Congress.
As it turns out, Durant's compilation was riddled with problems that
were not exposed until after it became law. 318 Within a few years, at least
252 defects were discovered, 3 19 requiring Congress to pass "constant[]
correct[ions]." 320 In 1877, "a statute was approved authorizing the
president to appoint a commissioner to prepare a new edition of the
Revised Statutes, inserting the statutes amending, modifying, and
affecting" Durant's original edition. 321 In 1878, Congress approved the
new edition as "legal evidence" of the laws. 322 But once bitten, twice shy,
have not attempted to change the law, in a single word or letter, so as to make a different reading
or different sense. All that has been done is to strike out the obsolete parts and to condense and
consolidate and bring together statutes in pari materia; so that you have here, except in so far as
it is human to err, the laws of the United States under which we now live."); Goldstein, supra note
301, at 520 (explaining that "[a]fter each member of the joint committee on revision had reviewed
for accuracy the particulartitles allocated to him, he led the congressional review of those portions
in a series of sixteen special nighttime sessions").
316. See Goldstein, supra note 301, at 518 (stating that Durant's draft "omitted all of the

Commission's textual notes"); see also id. at 519 n.199 (stating that "the rare book room of the
Library of Congress contains two almost identical copies of Durant's printed draft" and that "[a]
third copy with different marginal notes, obscurely referred to in the Library of Congress card
catalogue, could not be located"); id. ("During the debates, attempts were made to compare the
Durant printed draft with the Commissioner's draft containing the marginal notes; but differences
in section numbering and pagination, and limited numbers of copies, made this difficult."); 2
CONG. REC. 826 (1874) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (leaving little doubt that the initial version

of Durant's revision omitted all extraneous material from the commission's work, including
citations to the Statutes at Large: "The commissioners, as the law under which they acted required
of them, added 'side notes' or marginal references on the pages of their volumes to the original
statute, giving the volume, chapter, page, and section 'from which each section is compiled and
to the decisions of ... courts, explaining or expounding the same' .... The statute under which
Mr. Durant acted did not require any such reference, and he has, therefore, omitted all this.").
317. See 2 CONG. REC. 822 (1874) (seeming to show that no comments were made when the

clerk apparently read the relevant part of the bill on the House floor).
318. Dwan & Feidler, supra note 300, at 1014.

319. Id.
320. 7 CONG. REC. 1,137 (1878) (statement of Sen. Christiancy).
321. Dwan & Feidler, supra note 300, at 1016 (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1877, ch. 82, 19 Stat.
268).
322. Compare Act of Mar. 2, 1877, § 4, 19 Stat. at 269 (stating that the new edition would

be "legal and conclusive evidence of the laws ... therein contained"), with Act of Mar. 9, 1878,
ch. 26, 20 Stat. 27, 27 (striking out the word "conclusive" from the description of the new edition
as evidence of the laws and adding that the new edition "shall not preclude reference to, nor
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Congress declined to repeal the body of existing statutes or to enact the
new edition as law itself 323
The Dictionary Act's entry for "person" stayed constant between the
first and second editions of the Revised Statutes. 32 4 The final versions of
both editions, moreover, contain a marginal annotation pointing to the
provisions of the Statutes at Large purportedly incorporated into the
definitions, and both annotations list the 1871 Dictionary Act as the most
recent legislation reflected there. 325 So in 1874, the pertinent statutory
language became "partnerships and corporations." But from all
indications, it should have remained "bodies politic and corporate."
It is quite possible, of course, that the apparent failures to notice the
change to the definition of "person" were entirely inadvertent. That
would make sense in light of the volume of alterations in the original
commissioners' work, the process through which Durant drafted his
compilation, 326 and the number of inaccuracies that escaped the oversight
of the House committee and Congress at large.
But one could also ponder whether any of the failures might have been
intentional. Professor Robert Goldstein, for instance, has pointed to the
possibility that Durant purposely preserved a different change the original
commissioners made: the removal of a Reconstruction provision
"allowing federal courts to adjudicate causes 'affecting' persons unable
to secure in state court the equal rights guaranteed to them by federal
law," which Goldstein calls "the 'affecting jurisdiction.' 327 Noting that
control, in case of any discrepancy, the effect of any original act as passed by Congress since
[December 1, 1873]").
323. See supra note 322; see also Dwan & Feidler, supra note 300, at 1016 & n.45.
324. Compare supra note 308 and accompanying text, with 1 Rev. Stat. § 1 (2d ed. 1878)

(codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1) ("In determining the meaning of the revised statutes, or of
any act or resolution of Congress passed subsequent to February [25, 1871], . . the word 'person'
may extend and be applied to partnerships and corporations . . unless the context shows that such
words were intended to be used in a more limited sense .... ").
325. See 1 Rev. Stat. § 1 (2d ed. 1878) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1) (including "25
Feb., 1871, c. 71, s. 2, v. 16, p. 431" as the most recent enactment in the marginal annotation
under "Definitions"); Revised Statutes of 1874, § 1, 18 Stat., pt. 1, 1, 1 (codified as amended at 1
U.S.C. § 1) (same).
326. Durant began not with the text of the Statutes at Large (which would have taken far
longer than the nine-month maximum his assignment had been allotted, see 2 CONG. REC. 827
(1874) (statement of Rep. Lawrence)), but instead with the original commissioners' portfolio.
DURANT, supra note 304, at 1. Based on Durant's description of this dossier, it is easy to see how
he could have missed some modifications or introduced new ones while reworking it. "The
draught on the revision of the laws of the United States accepted by you from the commissioners,
and delivered by you to the undersigned, was a bundle of twenty-three hundred and ninety-eight
sheets," Durant explained in his report to the joint committee. Id. These pages, he said, were
"detached, partly printed, partly in manuscript, [and] profusely interspersed with interlineations
and corrections." Id.
327. Goldstein, supra note 301, at 477 (describing the provision, which was part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31,

§ 3,

14 Stat. 27, 27).
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"[t]he reasons for Durant's failure to rectify or report the Commission's
elimination of the affecting jurisdiction . .. remain obscure," Goldstein
citing litigation work of Durant's-writes that "[o]ne may speculate that
he was unsympathetic to the affecting jurisdiction and not predisposed to
restoring it in his draft." 328
A statutory amendment made inadvertently should still count as a
statutory amendment. 3 29 Although the Court has sometimes endorsed the
rebuttable proposition that "[i]t will not be inferred that the legislature, in
revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their policy,"330
at least one prominent proponent of this presumption, Cass Sunstein,
contends that because of the sweeping nature of the 1874 codification,
interpreters must give it full effect. 3 31 The point here, however, is not that
courts should have ignored the subtraction of "bodies politic and
corporate" from the definition of "person." The point here, instead, is that
this change provides little if any support for the notion that the public in
1871 would have understood the definition to exclude states-and in fact

328. Id. at 519.
329. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (stating that "we have

historically assumed that Congress intended what it enacted," such that it is irrelevant whether
"Congress was unaware of what it accomplished"). Professor Nelson points out that "[o]ne might
sensibly debate whether the word 'person' in the current version of [Section 1983] draws its
meaning from 1 U.S.C. § 1, as amended in 1948, or instead from Section 1 of the Revised Statutes
of 1874." CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 786 (2011). But he says "it is very

difficult to defend Justice Brennan's view [in Will] that the meaning of the word 'person' in
[Section 1983] comes neither from 1 U.S.C.

§

1 nor from Rev. Stat.

§

1, but instead from the

originalversion of the Dictionary Act as adopted by Congress in 1871." Id. The argument here
assumes that because of its broad language (directing that its definitions govern "[i]n determining
the meaning of any Act of Congress"), the current Dictionary Act controls. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis
added). But the argument here also assumes that the previous Dictionary Acts may be relevant to
determining whether Section 1983's "context indicates" that a more expansive meaning than the
default one applies. Id.; see supratext accompanying notes 241-244.
330. United States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729, 740 (1884).
331. See Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of FederalLaw, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 394, 407 (1982) ("[S]tatutory revisions undertaken by a commission created to

compile and organize existing law should not lightly be understood as making major changes. In
enacting statutory revisions submitted by such commissions, Congress is entitled to rely on their
good faith and should not be forced to read every provision with care.. .. [A] revision of a statute,
even if it appears to make a change in its text, should usually be interpreted conformably to
preexisting law."); id. at 408 ("[T]he revision of 1874 was in many respects unique. Unlike more
recent revisions, conducted as part of a continuing process of making the laws coherent and
accessible, it involved the consolidation and clarification of numerous conflicting and ambiguous
provisions. Its purpose was to bring all of these provisions together in a single authoritative
volume. In the process, a number of changes were made. If these changes-even when
unambiguous-were not given full effect, but instead were parsed by reference to pre-codification
law, the principal purpose of the revision would be frustrated. The revision would not be
authoritative, but a mere guide to congressional purposes expressed elsewhere, and the previous
inconsistencies would be perpetuated.").
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strengthens the possibility that the public in 1871 would have understood
the definition to include states.
B. Expected Applications
Various interpretive methodologies place weight on a statutory term's
expected applications among legislators. 332 So it is worth considering
whether members of the Congress that enacted Section 1983 thought it
made states susceptible to suit. And it is also worth considering whether
members of the public soon after Section 1983's passage thought so,
which sheds light on the statute's contemporary construction. 33 3 The
analysis that follows takes up these questions in turn, focusing first on the
statute's legislative history and then on its litigation history. 334
1. Legislative History
As described earlier, the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment and its
relation to any extratextual source of state sovereign immunity appear to
have remained at least somewhat up in the air during Reconstruction. 33 5
Just as one can find support for a broad understanding of
constitutionalized state sovereign immunity in the mid-nineteenth
century, 336 one can also find support for a narrow understanding during
this time period. 337 The Supreme Court would not decide Hans, and

332. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 102 (2010) ("A court that
looks to purposes is a court that works as a partner with Congress."); John F. Manning, The
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003) (describing "strong intentionalism" as
"permit[ting] a court to adjust a clear statute in the rare case in which the court finds that the
statutory text diverges from the legislature's true intent"). Even a dynamic approach to statutory
interpretation may only come into play for "the hard cases in which ambiguous statutes must be
interpreted in contexts not foreseen by the enacting legislature." Bertrall L. Ross II, Against
ConstitutionalMainstreaming,78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1227 (2011).
333. See Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 283-86

(2020) (discussing the "focus on 'expected public meaning"' within "flexible textualism").
334. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1750-51 (2020) (looking to a statute's
early litigation history to assert that "at least some people foresaw this potential application");
Manning, supranote 332, at 2390 (stating that the "legislature's true intent" for purposes of strong

intentionalism may be "derived from sources" including "the legislative history").
335. See supra notes 184-97 and accompanying text.
336. Justice Story's Commentaries are a favorite of this genre. See 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1669, at 538 (Boston, Hilliard,

Gray, & Co. 1833) ("It is a known maxim, justified by the general sense and practice of mankind,
and recognized in the law of nations, that it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amesnable [sic] to the suit of any private person, without its own consent. This exemption is an
attribute of sovereignty, belonging to every state in the Union; and was designedly retained by the
national government." (footnote omitted)).

337. See supra text accompanying notes 192-97 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion for the Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), and the Marshall

Court's approach to state sovereign immunity more generally).
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would not start down the path of profound state protectionism it still
travels today, until 1890.338
Given this backdrop, it should come as little surprise that in debating
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, several congressmen adverted to the
possibility of holding states monetarily liable for constitutional
violations. As John Harrison's masterful study of the Act's legislative
history explains, though, none of these comments came in discussions
about Section 1, the precursor to Section 1983.339 Instead, they came in
discussions about the so-called Sherman amendment, which sought to
impose damages on localities for failing to prevent certain kinds of
private violence. 340
One Republican opponent of the amendment, for instance, argued that
"this duty of protection, if it rests anywhere, rests on the State," such that
"if there is to be any liability visited upon anybody for a failure to perform
that duty, such liability should be brought home to the State." 34 1 He
further remarked that
this section would be liable to very much less objection, both
in regard to its justice and its constitutionality, if it provided
that if in any State the offenses named in this section were
committed, suit might be brought against the State, judgment
obtained, and payment of the judgment might be enforced
upon the treasury of the State. 342
Another example comes from a Democratic detractor, who said that in
light of the Fourteenth Amendment's text, "there might be some plausible
reasoning for saying that if the State did fail, then the State should be
liable." 343 Employing that notion as a "reductio ad absurdum argument
against Sherman's proposal" (to quote Harrison),344 the legislator
continued by contending that "upon the theory of this bill the capitol of
the State might be sold out; its court-houses might be sold out, its lunatic
asylums might be sold out, every institution of charity belonging to it
might be sold out," and "all its funds in the State treasury might be
seized," leaving it "without any means whatsoever to carry on the State
government." 345

So where do congressional comments concerning state suability in
conjunction with the Civil Rights Act of 1871 leave things? No concrete
evidence appears to indicate that legislators believed the measure, as
338. See supratext accompanying notes 46-47.
339. See Harrison, supra note 235, at 375-78.
340. See id. at 378-81.
341. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 791 (1871) (statement of Rep. Willard).
342. Id.
343. Id. at 772 (statement of Sen. Thurman).
344. Harrison, supra note 235, at 380.
345. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 772 (1871) (statement of Sen. Thurman).
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enacted, would subject states to damages liability. (The Sherman
amendment, it bears noting, eventually passed in a form that applied only
to individuals. 34 6 ) "[I]t is conceivable," of course, that Republicans "were
pulling a Trojan Horse, supporting a measure that had far-reaching
implications that they did not want to announce" (to quote Harrison
again). 347 But it seems more likely that the congressmen "did not even
fully appreciate" the potential "implications" of their own use of the word
"person" in Section 1.348
Harrison argues that "most probably a substantial and decisive bloc of
Republicans, indeed, probably a majority of them" thought abrogating
sovereign immunity was constitutionally impossible. 349 The use of hedge
words seems appropriate. But even if Harrison is right about the
overarching belief of Republican congressmen, the repeated references to
state suability in the legislative record demonstrate that the matter-both
as to constitutional understandings and legislative attitudes-was by no
means as clear-cut as the Court would later assume.
Given the lack of strong evidence that congressmen intended to
include states in Section 1983's ambit, one could ask whether the
retroactive application of the abrogation-related clear-statement rule is
actually antidemocratic in this context. The answer is yes. As an initial
matter, some schools of statutory interpretation care little if at all about
the subjective thoughts of specific congresspeople, largely severing
congressional intent from democratic legitimacy. 3 50 More broadly, the
antidemocratic effect of applying a clear-statement rule based on
substantive values inheres in the later judicial denial of earlier legislative
authority to select among the full range of available interventions: the
problem is the risk of requiring second-best statutory interpretations, not
the result.3 51

2. Litigation History
Turning from congressmen to the public they served, the statute's
early litigation history provides additional support for the notion that
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 could have been interpreted to
cover states. Section 1983 is famous for how infrequently plaintiffs
346. See Harrison, supra note 235, at 382.

347. Id. at 388. The specific Trojan Horse to which Harrison refers is the possibility that
Republicans smuggled abrogation authority into Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment without
saying anything about it in the Amendment's legislative history. See id. But the same logic could
apply to state suability under Section 1983.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 385.
350. See infra Part II.C.

351. See Slocum, supra note 83, at 639 (describing "second-best interpretations" as ones
"that would not have been chosen if not for the application of' a particular "rule[] of
interpretation").
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appear to have relied on it before the Court decided Monroe in 1961352
and for the wide variety of possible reasons why. 353 So it should come as
little surprise that the pool of cases from which the inquiry started was
small. But research revealed two cases from the 1870's where individuals
apparently attempted to hold states accountable for constitutional
violations in federal court under Section 1983-and that neither case
failed on the ground that a state was an improper party.
Consider first the 1874 case Illinois v. Chicago & A.R. Co. 354 Illinois
brought a prosecution in state court against a railroad for violating a state
rate statute.3 55 Relying on the statute now called Section 1983, the
railroad sought and obtained a writ of certiorari from a federal court to
remove the case from the state judicial system to the federal judicial
system. 3 56 The state moved to quash the writ. 357 The federal court
addressed two issues-first, whether the railroad company could claim
the protections of Section 1983, and second, whether Section 1983
granted the federal courts removal jurisdiction in addition to original
jurisdiction. 358 The court assumed that the answer to the former question
was yes and held that the answer to the latter question was no.359
Chicago & A.R. Co. matters for present purposes because (while not
expressly discussed in the decision) it seems that the railroad's theory of
the case must have depended on Illinois being a "person" within the
meaning of Section 1983, which would have been necessary to allow the
railroad to remove to federal court a case in which the state was the only
adverse party. 360 This suggests that regardless how congressmen thought
the statute would work, litigants around the time of its adoption thought
it at least potentially applied to states. The court, moreover, raised no
doubts about this aspect of the case. The court wrote that if the railroad
was right that it could claim the protections of Section 1983 and "ifit be
conceded, further, that the state was prosecuting an action of debt for a
penalty which could not be imposed without causing the company to be

352. See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its

Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 819 n.37 (2010) ("For
nearly one hundred years after its enactment, [Section 1983] was rarely used .... Thus, between
1871 and 1920, only twenty-one section 1983 actions were decided by federal courts .... ").
Figures like these may be limited by the available evidence, for courts did not always recount the
precise statutory basis for their authority to decide cases. But figures like these still provide a
general indication of the scarcity of Section 1983 litigation.
353. See, e.g., Blackmun, supra note 207, at 7-20.
354. 12F. Cas. 1197 (C.C.S.D. Ill. 1874).

355. Id. at 1197.
356.
357.
358.
359.

See
See
See
See

id. at 1197-98.
id.
id. at 1198.
id. at 1198-99.

360. See id. at 1198.
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subjected to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities granted
by the constitution," the operative issue was removal-and, by
implication, removal alone. 36 1
A second early instance in which a party invoked Section 1983 in a
suit against a state was somewhat similar. Like Chicago & A.R. Co., the
1878 case Ex parte Wells 362 seems to have presented a question about
Section 1983 and removal. 363 Three individuals, all of whom were
"returning officers" of the 1876 presidential election, all of whom were
Republicans, and two of whom were Black, were charged by the
Louisiana attorney general with falsifying vote tallies. 364 The petitioners
sought a writ of certiorari to remove the prosecution to federal court under
Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.365 In its codified form, this
statute provided that any state civil or criminal suit "against any person
who is denied or cannot enforce in the judicial tribunals of the
State . . any right secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil
rights of citizens of the United States" could be removed to federal
court. 366 The petitioners' attorneys appeared to have argued that Section
1983 qualified as a law providing for equal civil rights within the meaning
of this provision-such that their clients' potential loss of the Sixth
Amendment impartial-jury right because of racial prejudice, among other
potential deprivations, secured them a spot in federal court. 367
The federal court-speaking through Justice Joseph Bradley, who
would later write the majority opinion in Hans, riding circuit-rejected
the plea for removal on the ground that the constitutional violations the
petitioners alleged were not constitutional violations at all. 368 The
procedure for selecting jurors by commissioners, the court said, was
above reproach. 3 69 And while "[t]he commissioners, it is true, may abuse
their trust[,] . . . no system can be devised that will not be liable to
abuses." 370 The court reasoned similarly with respect to the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. "It is only when some . . . hostile state legislation can be
shown to exist, interfering with the party's right of defense, that he can

361. Id.
362. 29 F. Cas. 633 (C.C.D. La. 1878).

363. See id. at 634 (background information preceding opinion).
364. Id. at 633 (synopsis).

365. Ch. 31,

§ 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1443);

see Wells, 29 F. Cas. at 633 (synopsis).
366. 1 Rev. Stat. § 641.

367. See Wells, 29 F. Cas. at 633-34 (synopsis and background information preceding
opinion).
368. Id. at 634-35 (opinion).
369. See id.
370. Id. at 635.
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have his cause removed to the federal court." 37 1 The court held that the
petitioners' "allegations with regard to the manipulation of the law in
such manner as to secure a jury inimical to [them], and with regard to the
existence of a general prejudice against them in the minds of the court,
the jurors, the officials and the people," did not qualify. 372
Again, therefore, litigants relied on Section 1983 in an attempt to get
a case against a state into federal court. And again, the attempt failed for
reasons having nothing to do with whether Section 1983 applied to states.
To be sure, Section 1983 was not as central in Wells as it was in Chicago
& A.R. Co. But the "right secured" by Section 1983 was the right to seek
redress against any "person" who violated someone's federal legal
protections. To the extent the petitioners sought to vindicate this right by
removing their state-court prosecution to federal court, the "person"
available to be held accountable would appear to have been the state
itself. So Wells, too, suggests that some members of the public interpreted
Section 1983 to operate against states themselves.
To be sure, these cases do not provide unassailable proof that Section
1983 was initially understood to cover states. The parties seeking federalcourt review may have been grasping at jurisdictional straws; the analysis
here may overread the litigation strategies; or both. But these cases offer
some early potential evidence in favor of the interpretation explored here.
C. MethodologicalMatters
Sometimes statutes can entail "unexpected consequences." 373 So
begins Justice Neil Gorsuch's pioneering and provocative majority
opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County,374 decided last year. Bostock held
that the prohibition on sex discrimination in Title VII forbids adverse
employment actions on the basis of sexual orientation or transgender
identity-notwithstanding, as Gorsuch observed, that "[t]hose who
adopted the Civil Rights Act [of 1964] might not have anticipated their
work would lead to this particular result." 37 5
The outlook here is meant to be ecumenical among interpretive
methodologies (while admittedly emphasizing the kind of textualist
considerations stressed by the current Supreme Court). But for someone
who follows an approach similar to Bostock's, what could amount to the
best interpretation of "person" in Section 1983 might have surprised
many of the legislators who adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1871. For
under that approach, "the limits of the drafters' imagination supply no
371. Id. (possibly suggesting this removal provision was limited to rights secured by the
same act).
372. Id.

373. Bostockv. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
374. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
375. Id. at 1737.
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reason to ignore the law's demands." 37 6 To the contrary, the Court said:
"When the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual
considerations suggest another, it's no contest. Only the written word is
the law .... "377
Professor Tara Grove has explained that "Bostock revealed . .
important tensions within" the textualist school of thought. 37 8 On the one
hand, Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion employed what Grove calls
"formalistic textualism," which "instructs interpreters to carefully parse
the statutory language, focusing on semantic context and downplaying
policy concerns or the practical (even monumental) consequences of the
case." 379 On the other hand, Justice Samuel Alito's and Justice Brett
Kavanaugh's dissents (with the former joined by Justice Clarence
Thomas) employed what Grove calls "flexible textualism," which
"attends to text but permits interpreters to make sense of that text by
considering policy and social context as well as practical
consequences." 3 80 In Bostock itself, these extratextual concerns centered
around arguments about how members of the enacting Congress assumed
the statute would apply. 381
The issue of state suability under Section 1983 presents a fascinating
case study in formalistic versus flexible textualism. Indeed, much of the
Court's language in Bostock favoring semantic meaning over expected
applications could map directly onto the present discussion. The statute
in question "is a major piece of federal civil rights legislation"; "[i]t is
written in starkly broad terms"; "[i]t has repeatedly produced unexpected
applications, at least in the view of those on the receiving end of them";
and "Congress's key drafting choices . . . virtually guaranteed that
unexpected applications would emerge over time." 382 To the extent that
Section 1983 may be best read as withdrawing states' sovereign
immunity, one could say just as in Bostock that "[t]his elephant has never
hidden in a mousehole; it has been standing before us all along." 383
There are, of course, many schools of statutory interpretation besides
different forms of textualism. A few prominent alternatives include
intentionalism, purposivism, imaginative reconstruction, dynamic

376.
377.
378.
379.

Id.

Id.
Grove, supra note 333, at 266.
Id. at 267.

380. Id.
381. 140 S. Ct. at 1750.
382. Id. at 1753.
383. Id.; see Whitman v.

Am.

Trucking

Ass'ns,

531

U.S.

457,

468

(2001)

("Congress ... does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.").
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statutory interpretation, and practical reasoning.3 8 4 "Nor do these exhaust
the list," as one scholar puts it. 385 How would the considerations fleshed
out here bear on understandings of Section 1983 under these other
approaches?
"Intentionalists attempt to draw interpretive inferences from the
legislature's stated goals and from a statute's legislative history."386
Because of the tight connection between a provision's meaning and the
enacting legislators' expressions, intentionalism would likely look dimly
on the possibility of including states within Section 1983's scope.
Purposivists believe that "[b]ecause 'every statute . . has some kind of
purpose or objective,' identifying that purpose and deducing the
interpretation with which it is most consistent resolves interpretive
ambiguities." 3 87 Given this more capacious lens, purposivism would
probably look more favorably on the possibility of including states within
Section 1983's scope, especially in light of arguments that accomplishing
Congress's overarching goal of promoting constitutional enforcement
through enacting Section 1983 as part of the exceptional Reconstruction
era requires the availability of entity liability. Imaginative reconstruction
says that "the judge should imagine that she is talking to the legislators at
the time of enactment and should reconstruct how the legislators would
have answered the interpretive question, given their values and their
concerns." 388 As something of a middle ground between intentionalism
and purposivism, either answer to the question about Section 1983 and
state suability seems conceivable under this approach.
That leaves dynamic statutory interpretation and practical reasoning.
"Academic advocates of 'dynamic' interpretation argue that it is perfectly
legitimate for statutory meanings to evolve to reflect current
circumstances and contemporary mores," which may include "ideas of
sound policy" that "can change over time. "389 The practical-reasoning
model posits that "statutory interpreters . . . are normally not driven by
any single value . .. but are instead driven by multiple values," including
"finding the best answer according to modern policy." 390 These theories
are multitextured and irreducible to simplistic applications. But to the
extent that they include present policy considerations more than the
384. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory
Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 17-18 (2003).
385. Id. at 18.
386. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Symposium, Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and
Empiricist, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 747, 747 (1995).
387. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 333 (1990) (quoting 1 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 166-67 (tentative ed. 1958)).
388. Id. at 329.
389. NELSON, supra note 329, at 945.
390. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 387, at 348.

582

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

73

frameworks discussed above do, their adherents may be especially likely
to support including states as Section 1983 defendants for the normative
reasons introduced below. 39 1
Even setting aside the ultimate answer (perhaps because one would
weigh the evidence differently), the analysis here shows that whether an
interpreter should understand Section 1983 as covering states qua states
is a far closer question than the Court and previous commentary have
acknowledged. One could, therefore, view the caselaw in this area as an
instance of the Court imbuing indeterminate language with ideological
content-which, as in the context of so-called common law statutes,
could in theory point in opposite directions when it comes to pursuing an
alternative course within the judicial system. 392 Either way (whether the
Court made a debatable call on interpretive grounds or a discretionary
call on ideological grounds), the policy debate behind and possibility of
political reform becomes quite important.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM

The preceding Parts have revealed substantial arguments for reading
Section 1983 to abrogate sovereign immunity, which would make state
governments susceptible to damages actions for violating constitutional
rights. A decision like Bostock-which surprised many observers
because of both the outcome and the majority opinion's author 393 -may
provide a bit of reason to think the Supreme Court could someday
reconsider its caselaw in this area. But the evidence remains equivocal
and may not be strong enough to justify overruling otherwise settled
precedent. And while stare decisis stands as an obstacle to reassessing
391. See infra Part IV.
392. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 641 n.12 (1983) (Stevens,

J., dissenting) (stating that "Congress phrased some older statutes in sweeping, general terms,
expecting the federal courts to interpret them by developing legal rules on a case-by-case basis in
the common law tradition" and citing Section 1983 as an example). On the one hand, some would
reject dubious interpretation (at least as a textual matter) as a reason for the judiciary to move
away from prior decisions establishing the meaning of common-law statutes because even
"[t]extualists concede that text is not controlling" here. Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive
Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are "Common-Law Statutes" Different?, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 89-106, 89 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed.,

2013). On the other hand, common-law statutes are said to license courts to employ a "relaxed"
form of stare decisis by allowing them to "rescind[]" decisions "that over time prove unworkable
or inconsistent with general policy." William N. Eskridge, Jr., OverrulingStatutory Precedents,
76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1377 (1988).
393. See, e.g., Duke Law FacultyReact to Landmark Supreme CourtDecision in Bostock v.
Clayton County, Ga., DUKE LAW (June 17, 2020), https://law.duke.edu/news/duke-law-faculty-

react-landmark-supreme-court-decision-bostock-v-clayton-county-ga/
[https://perma .cc/ZJ7FU24H] (quoting Professor Trina Jones as stating that "[t]his is an extraordinarily wonderful-and
somewhat surprising-outcome" and reporting that "there was widespread surprise that Justice
Gorsuch not only joined his liberal colleagues, but wrote the opinion").
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caselaw in any context, the Roberts Court, building on the work of the
Rehnquist Court, 3 94 has fortified and forwarded states' immunity
protections with hardly a look back. 395 The Court's recent decisions,
moreover, have displayed a similar trend favoring government
defendants on a range of civil rights questions. 396
Nevertheless, encouraging the legal community to reconsider Section
1983's nonabrogation of sovereign immunity holds relevance not only
for the unlikely prospect of judicial change, but also for the possibility of
legislative reform. For just as "[e]xposing the Court's choices lets us
make a clearer and more responsible decision about whether those
choices are the right ones or whether, having given us such a categorical
immunity doctrine, the Court should now take some of it back," 397
exposing the Court's choices can also highlight the desirability of
legislative intervention.
Fully exploring the critical questions concerning the normative value
of state sovereign immunity in the current constitutional-tort system lies
beyond the scope of the present project. But introducing the conditions
confronting congresspeople and sketching a possible path forward helps
lay the foundation for follow-on work where I address the possibility of
political reform in greater detail. 39 8
A. The Policy Landscape
Over time, various commentators have advocated the availability of
entity accountability for constitutional torts.3 99 As now-Judge Nina
394. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (declaring that "the States retain

immunity from private suit in their own courts"); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
72-73 (1996) (declaring that "Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations
placed upon federal jurisdiction" under the Eleventh Amendment).
395. See, e.g., Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994,

1007

(2020) (concluding that "Article I's

Intellectual Property Clause [can]not provide the basis for an abrogation of sovereign immunity"
and that "Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment [can]not support an abrogation on a legislative
record like the one here"); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019) ("This

case . . . requires us to decide whether the Constitution permits a State to be sued by a private
party without its consent in the courts of a different State. We hold that it does not .... ").
396. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1863 (2017) (holding that "the Court of

Appeals erred by allowing respondents' detention policy claims to proceed under Bivens," which
provides a mechanism for suing federal officials for certain constitutional violations); id. at 1869
("Petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3)."). There are, however, some deviations from this trend. See Katherine Mims Crocker,
The Supreme Court's Reticent Quaified Immunity Retreat, 71 DUKE L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming
2021).
397. Baude, supra note 236, at 78 (discussing qualified immunity).
398. See Katherine Mims Crocker, QuaifiedImmunity, Sovereign Immunity, and Systemic

Reform, 71 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=3796337.

399. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 237, at 100-21.
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Pillard has observed, "A range of rationales can be cited for government
liability." 4 0 In addition to agency-level deterrence arguments, for
instance, the fact that "constitutional violations require state action"
means that "the government that made an abuse of its official power
possible should arguably be held accountable for that abuse." 40 1 There
are compelling reasons to believe that states almost always indemnify
their employees-who are already subject to Section 1983 actions for
damages under Monroe-from constitutional-tort litigation costs and
judgments. 402 And in the event that "individual officials are judgmentproof' and complete indemnification is unavailable, "only governmental
liability can provide full compensation. "403 What is more, while local
governments can be made to answer in damages for some
unconstitutional acts, state governments can facilitate unlawful conduct
to the same extent without direct monetary consequences. 40 4 And these
are only a sampling of the reasons why state-government liability in
Section 1983 suits could make good sense.
Until very recently, however, both commentators and policymakers
seemed to have resigned themselves to viewing sovereign immunity as a
permanent part of constitutional enforcement. In 1999, Judge Pillard
noted that while the period between 1973 and 1985 saw twenty-one bills
"introduced in Congress seeking to replace individual liability" for
constitutional violations by federal officials "with direct governmental
liability," no such bill "ha[d] been introduced since." 40 5 A decade later,
Aziz Huq declared the constitutional-tort regime "stable," noting that "it
is hardly clear how the diffuse class of possible constitutional tort
plaintiffs could overcome evident transaction costs to collective actions
to seek legislated change." 4 06
Things are shifting. Spurred by the murder of George Floyd and
countless other acts of police violence captured on cellphone video and
400. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking FictionSeriously: The Strange Results ofPublic Officials'
Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEo. L.J. 65, 74 (1999).
401. Id. at 75.
402. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnfication, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014)

(focusing on law enforcement officers).
403. Pillard, supra note 400, at 75.
404. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (holding that local
governments are not wholly immune from suit under § 1983). It stands to reason that more

constitutional violations happen under local control than under state control. But state officials
are still regularly accused of violating people's constitutional rights, including in the police useof-force context on which the discussion below focuses. See, e.g., Hannah Knowles, Body-Cam
Video Shows Louisiana TroopersStunned, Hit and DraggedBlackMan Before His Death, WASH.
POST, May 20, 2021, 12:33 PM, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/05/20/ronald-

greene-louisiana-police-video/ [https://perma.cc/5YDD-42TJ].
405. Pillard, supra note 400, at 98.
406. Aziz Z. Huq, Against NationalSecurity Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 261
& n.157.
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echoed around the Internet, "collective actions to seek legislated change"
have been gathering steam. And congresspeople have been responding,
with multiple bills and resolutions aimed at altering constitutional-tort
law proposed over the last couple years. So far, these legislative efforts
have largely focused on revising or rejecting qualified immunity, 40 7
which shields police officers and other government officials sued for
violating federal constitutional rights from having to pay money damages
unless their conduct's unlawfulness was "clearly established" at the time
it occurred. 408 Calls to restrain or reject qualified immunity are well
founded, 4 09 and other potential reforms (like expanding municipal
liability) are important as well. But the relative lack of attention to
sovereign immunity has represented an unfortunate oversight that the
policy path sketched here could help remedy. 410
B. A Possible Path Forward
There are good reasons for Congress to make states suable in damages
for constitutional-tort claims across the board. But there are also good
reasons for Congress to start with Fourth Amendment excessive force
407. See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. § 102 (2021)
(as passed by House, Mar. 3, 2021); Ending Qualified Immunity Act, S. 4142, 116th Cong.
(2020); Reforming Qualified Immunity Act, S. 4036, 116th Cong. (2020); George Floyd Justice
in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. § 102 (2020) (as passed by House, June 25,
2020); Ending Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020); Restoration of Civil
Rights Act of 2019, H.R. 7115, 116th Cong. (2020); S. Res. 602, 116th Cong. (2020); H.R. Res.

702, 116th Cong. (2019).
408. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

409. See Katherine Mims Crocker, Quaified Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117
MICH. L. REV. 1405, 1457-58 (2019).

410. The Restoration of Civil Rights Act of 2019 did seek to address state sovereign
immunity, H.R. 7115, but attracted less notice and support than qualified immunity reform efforts
did. And recent media reports indicate that Senator Tim Scott is pursuing a compromise on
qualified immunity that may involve increased entity liability. See Seung Min Kim, Annie
Linskey, & Marianna Sotomayor, Chauvin Verdict Injects a FreshJolt of Momentum into Police
Overhaul Efforts, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2021, 7:58 PM, https://www.washingtonpost.com/

politics/chauvin-verdict-police-overhaul/2021/04/21/fa47d65c-a2a0-1leb-85fc-06664ff4489d_
story.html [https://perma.cc/UU2K-HLHW] ("Republicans have especially balked at dumping the
'qualified immunity' standard, which they say allows police officers to do their job without the
threat of potentially frivolous lawsuits. Scott said Wednesday one potential compromise is holding
liable police departments, rather than individual officers."). The details remain sketchy, however,
and it is not clear that state-government liability-as opposed to only local-government liabilityis on the table. See Manu Raju, Jessica Dean, & Ted Barrett, GOP Senator Floats Compromise

on Policing Legislation as Bipartisan Talks Pick Up Pace, CNN, Apr. 21, 2021, 6:20 PM,
https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/21/politics/policing-reform-talks-congress-latestnegotiations/index.html [https://perma.cc/NY5Q-EREK] ("'We need the individual officers and
the agencies to be accountable,' [Representative Karen] Bass said after talking on the Senate floor
with key Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee. 'Because I think if the agencies, the
cities, if they're concerned about lawsuits, they will not want to have problem officers. "').
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claims while keeping an eye toward gradually removing sovereign
immunity protections for other constitutional violations in the future.
1. Focusing on Excessive Force
Excessive force is neither the only kind of government conduct nor
the only kind of constitutional violation that calls out for deep and wide
reform. But excessive force is of paramount importance in the present
moment. Evidence indicates that law enforcement officers use deadly
force with alarming frequency and that they use it against different racial
groups with alarming asymmetry. 41 1 It is no surprise, therefore, that
police violence, especially toward communities of color, has spurred the
protests that have pushed the nation into an extended period of collective
soul-searching.
On a community level, rooting out unjustified uses of force is essential
to improving relationships between law enforcement agencies and the
citizens they serve, particularly in localities facing years of abuse. 41 2 On
an individual level, physical violence implicates a person's constitutional
interest in bodily integrity in an elemental way. 4 13 Policymakers can no
longer overlook how current practices reflect a "history of state overpolicing and brutalization of Black bodies dating back to slavery and
Reconstruction" and continue to produce injuries that are uniquely
harmful in collective and personal senses alike. 4 14 Excessive force claims
are, therefore, an obvious starting point for any project seeking to
increase accountability for constitutional wrongs.

411. See Lynne Peeples, BrutalityandRacialBias: What the Data Say, 583 NATURE, July 2,
2020, at 22-23 (discussing the available data and stating as follows: "About 1,000 civilians are
killed each year by law-enforcement officers in the United States. By one estimate, Black men are
2.5 times more likely than white men to be killed by police during their lifetime. And in another
study, Black people who were fatally shot by police seemed to be twice as likely as white people
to be unarmed.").
412. See Debo P. Adegbile, Policing Through an American Prism, 126 YALE L.J. 2222,
2225-27 (2017).

413. The Supreme Court has repeatedly focused on bodily integrity in the search side of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Missouriv. McNeely, for instance, the Court recognized that

"an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual's 'most personal and deep-rooted
expectations of privacy."' 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760
(1985)). And in Schmerber v. Calfornia, the Court said that "[t]he integrity of an individual's

person is a cherished value of our society." 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
414. Erika Wilson, Response, The GreatAmerican Dilemma: Law and the Intransigenceof

Racism, 20 CUNY L. REV. 513, 518 (2017); see also Brandon Hasbrouck, Essay, Abolishing
Racist Policing with the Thirteenth Amendment, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 200, 206 (2020)
(presenting a historical overview to argue that "[i]n both the North and the South, formal policing
in America has racist roots").
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2. Taking a Gradual Approach
From a political perspective, proceeding in a gradual fashion should
prove more successful than seeking rapid change. Problems of police
violence underlie the current legislative interest in constitutional-tort law,
and Congress has thus chosen to concentrate on proposals targeted at
policing while sidelining legislation aimed at wider-ranging concerns.
On June 4, 2020, for instance, Representatives Justin Amash and
Ayanna Pressley introduced the Ending Qualified Immunity Act, which
would have abolished qualified immunity from Section 1983 suits for any
and all officials. 415 Less than a week later, Representative Karen Bass
introduced the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020,416 the
primary Democratic proposal responding to Floyd's killing and the
ensuing unrest. Among other measures, this bill would have ended
qualified immunity in Section 1983 suits for "investigative" and "law
enforcement" officials only. 417 While no proposal cutting back on
qualified immunity was expected to advance in the Senate last year
because of Republican opposition,418 the latter bill fared far better than
the former one did. The Ending Qualified Immunity Act drew only a few
dozen co-sponsors and never made it out of committee. 4 19 The George
Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020 garnered more than 200 cosponsors and passed the full House. 42 0 Critically, the George Floyd
Justice in Policing Act of 2021 has also passed the House and has
momentum heading into the Senate. 42 1
Of course, any attempt to establish government liability for
constitutional torts would generate pushback, especially in today's
exceptionally polarized political climate. But President Joe Biden has
signaled a desire to prioritize police reform, including by endorsing the
415. Ending Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020).

416. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. § 102 (2020) (as
passed by House, June 25, 2020).
417. Id.
418. See Jamie Ehrlich, Democrats Team for Effort to EndDoctrineShieldingPolice as GOP
Backs Off, CNN (July 1, 2020, 9:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/01/politics/qualifiedimmunity-senate-markey-warren-sanders/index.html [https://perma.cc/NF8G-C4P5].
419. HR.7085 - Ending Qualified Immunity Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/ l6th-congress/house-bill/7085?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22hr
7085%22%5D%7D&r=1&s=3 [https://perma.cc/P8R7-Y9Q7].
420. HR.7120 - George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, CONGRESS.GOV,

https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 16th-congress/housebill/7120?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22hr7120%22%5D%7D&s=4&r=1
[https://perma.cc/5CV3-SA8K].

421. See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong.

§ 102 (2021)
&

(as passed by House, Mar. 3, 2021); Kim, Linskey, & Sotomayor, supra note 410; Raju, Dean,

Barrett, supra note 410. Representative Pressley recently reintroduced the Ending Qualified
Immunity Act, but it remains in committee. See Ending Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 1470, 117th

Cong. (2021).

588

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

73

George Floyd Justice in Policing Act. 422 And Senator Tim Scott, a
Republican, has worked hard with colleagues to try to forge bipartisan
compromise in this Democratic-dominated area. 423 At the least, pursuing
a piecemeal approach should lower the amplitude of some arguments
against broad-based interventions. And it could allow Congress to use
early measures as case studies to fine-tune and effectuate further-reaching
changes in the future.
Admittedly, this brief sketch of the policy landscape and a potential
path through it provokes questions to a greater degree than it provides
answers. How would state-government liability affect the public fisc? Or
the volume of constitutional-tort litigation? Would increasing the scope
of constitutional remedies paradoxically encourage courts to decrease the
scope of substantive rights? And what about the federal government:
should it also face damages judgments for violating people's
constitutional protections? What standard should govern the imposition
of government liability, anyway, especially since the Supreme Court has
long rejected a respondeat superior model for municipalities sued under
Section 1983?424
These questions, along with any number of related inquiries, are
enormously important. They all emerge at the intersection of myriad legal
doctrines and practices, implicating a constellation of concerns that
scholars often discuss under the rubric of "remedial equilibration. "425
With the discussion here setting the stage, forthcoming work of mine
offers a fuller look at fundamental issues like these. 42 6
CONCLUSION

This Article has reconsidered Section 1983's nonabrogation of
sovereign immunity from multiple standpoints. Proceeding from a
negative perspective, the analysis has shown how the Supreme Court's
caselaw rests on dubious interpretive decisions and historical
assumptions. Adopting a more affirmative approach, the analysis has also
422. Catie Edmondson & Nicholas Fandos, Buoyed by Floyd Verdict, Congress Eyes New
Bid to Overhaul Policing, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 28, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/21/

us/politics/congress-police-reform.html [https://perma.cc/SXP5-XAMX].
423. See id.; see also supra note 410.
424. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding that "Congress

did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy
of some nature caused a constitutional tort" and that "[i]n particular,... a municipality cannot be
held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be
held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory").
425. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 858 (1999) (describing remedial equilibration as the theory that "rights and remedies
are inextricably intertwined," with rights "dependent on remedies not just for their application to
the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence").
426. See Crocker, supra note 398.
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offered evidence in favor of reading Section 1983 to allow civil actions
against states, while carefully considering counterevidence too. The
upshot is that the case for state suability is stronger than the Court or
previous commentary has credited. Lastly, this Article connected this
backward-looking discussion to the possibility of forward-looking
improvement of the American constitutional-tort system, especially in
relation to the present movement for racial justice and police reform.

